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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis aims to provide a history of African American working class 
and Leftist activism in Atlanta, Georgia during the early 1970s.  It places a series 
of wildcat strikes within the context of political and social transition, and charges 
unequal economic conditions and a racially charged discriminatory environment 
as primary causes.  The legacies of both the Civil Rights Movement and the New 
Left are identified as key contributing factors to this wave of labor unrest.  One 
path taken by former Civil Right activists was to focus on poor peoples’ 
movements, and one course taken by the 1960s-era New Left activists was to 
join forces with the working class in an attempt to build a New Communist 
movement.  In Atlanta, these two forces converged and generated a notable 
force against some of city’s most prominent employers.   
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1 
Introduction 
 
I initially learned of the strike at Atlanta’s Mead Packaging Plant in the 
book Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao, and Che, by Max 
Elbaum during a directed readings course on social movements of the 1960s and 
70s.  The brief mention of Atlanta intrigued me since I was not aware of any 
radical group activity in the city during this era.  Considering that the strike took 
place within miles of campus and the age of the activists involved, I thought it 
would be an ideal topic for an oral history project the following semester, so I 
began researching.     
Research 
I was pleased to find that Georgia State University’s Southern Labor 
Archives held a collection called the Joseph Nelson Papers, which included a 
great deal of information about the strike. In his book, Elbaum mentions that 
there was a film on the strike, produced by members of the communist 
organizers, the October League.  Fortunately, I was able to located and borrow a 
copy of the film.  Next, I consulted the newspapers The Great Speckled Bird, The 
Atlanta Journal, The Call, The Atlanta Daily World, and The Atlanta Voice.  Upon 
doing so, I noticed that a number of strikes occurred in Atlanta throughout 1972, 
in addition to the strike at Mead, and realized there must be a larger story than I 
expected to find. 
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 The arbitration documents and correspondence held in the Joseph Nelson 
collection contained a long list of names of workers who had been dismissed in 
the Mead strike, as well as one worker who had killed his supervisor the previous 
year.  I searched the phone book and, through trial and error, was able to locate 
some of the participants and the convicted worker.  I talked to several of them on 
the telephone.  After introducing myself, each person paused in a similar manner, 
and then very politely but firmly told me that they were not interested in speaking 
to me about the subject.  I expected that I would meet some resistance at this 
level, but thought that it was simply reluctance to participate because they felt 
that they did not have much to contribute.  After several attempts to convince 
each person of the story’s importance, I made no progress. 
 Next, I consulted some of my professors for suggestions as to whom I 
should try to contact.  The same names surfaced in each conversation; so I 
attempted to reach them next.  After a few failed attempts Lauren Kata, the 
archivist at the Southern Labor Archives, introduced me to one person I had 
been trying to reach - Gary Washington, the current host of WRFG radio’s labor 
forum.  Washington turned out to be the former treasurer of the Mead Caucus of 
Rank and File Workers, the strike’s organizing committee, and agreed to an 
interview.  From him, I was able to gain useful insight into the strike, the 
mobilizing efforts, and the interactions among various community and 
organizational entities during that time period.   
3 
 I continued to have trouble convincing other participants to talk.  In one 
case I spoke to a former member of the October League, who was somewhat 
leery at first but warmed up during our conversations.  He agreed to be 
interviewed and even said he would help me with the project by copying a disc of 
scanned strike documents he had.  His participation seemed promising and we 
ended our conversation on and up-beat note.  After many attempts to reach him 
again, he never responded.    A similar situation occurred with another former OL 
member, one of the few African American women to join the group, who agreed 
to be interviewed, but then ignored my repeated calls.  One participant, who is 
now a successful businessman, contacted a member of the History Department 
and asked that person to relay the message to me that he was not involved in 
any way.  Another former OL member suggested that I change my topic because 
he thought nobody would admit their involvement with a communist organization 
in today’s conservative political climate.  While I was aware of changing political 
beliefs among former members of the Left, I did not expect to meet this much 
resistance.   I thought participants would be willing to discuss their past activities, 
even if their memories were heavily colored by hindsight.  Overall, I encountered 
tremendous difficulty locating people who were willing to agree to an interview. 
 Fortunately, one person Dr. Lutz suggested, John Fletcher, a former 
October League Member who worked in Atlanta during that time period and then 
moved on to organize in Birmingham happily agreed to an interview.  I traveled to 
Leeds, Alabama, outside of Birmingham to meet with him in his home.  Though 
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he did not work at Mead until after the strike, I was able to gain insight from him 
into how the OL operated.  As an OL insider, he was able to confirm that the 
organization specifically targeted Atlanta as an organizing center for communist 
party building, that they intentionally got jobs at Mead and other companies in 
Atlanta for the express purpose of organizing the workers, and that they were, in 
fact, the outside agitators that the media’s red baiting campaigns claimed.  
 Another interview I conducted was with Georgia State Representative, 
Nan Orrack.  Because her secretary set up the meeting, she was not aware of 
the interview subject until I was already setting up my recording equipment.  
Upon hearing the topic of my interview, she politely told me that she did not want 
to go on record about any organizations from the time period, but was very 
forthcoming about what she remembered.  Since she was “red baited” in a recent 
campaign, I want to make clear that her name was not mentioned in any of the 
October League material I obtained.  She was an employee and union member 
at Nabisco, which held a wildcat strike directly prior to Mead, and provided 
valuable information about that strike. 
Through a series of conversations, and after further research, I realized 
that I was dealing with an extremely sensitive subject.  Undeterred, I used the 
material I gathered and began to piece together the story of what happened in 
1972, and eventually decided to develop the project into my Master’s thesis.  
Some of the missing pieces were filled by material I received from Kerry Taylor, a 
PhD student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, who learned about 
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my thesis through my advisor, Dr. Cliff Kuhn.  He had a box of old documents 
given to him by Jerry Harris, the last leader of the group that evolved from the 
October League, and copied a large amount of material for me.  The thesis that 
follows is my analysis of what happened in Atlanta in 1972. 
 
Significance 
In 1972, Atlanta experienced an outbreak of labor unrest among many of 
its black workers.   With racial discrimination at the center of each dispute, 
employees at more than a dozen companies throughout the city walked out to 
protest unequal pay and working conditions.  Lacking the support of labor unions, 
workers banded together and joined forces with Civil Rights organizations and 
Leftist groups to fight for what they felt was just.  Unusual to the south, this series 
of strikes warrants closer examination.  This project explores why so many of 
Atlanta’s workers risked their jobs to go out on strike that year.   
I aim to prove that the flurry of labor unrest in Atlanta in 1972 was not 
spontaneous.  The protests evolved out of a larger historical phenomenon, 
resulting from a combination of two dynamics.  Holdover tension and lessons 
from the Civil Rights Movement combined with a behind-the-scenes network of 
communist activity born out of the New Left and culminated into what one 
participant described as “strike fever.” 
This work will contribute to several areas of scholarship.  It will add to the 
literature about Atlanta history during this time period.  Much of what has been 
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written about the city in this era covers earlier Civil Rights Movement activity and 
then moves directly into Maynard Jackson’s first term as mayor, and mostly 
focuses on the middle class or black elite, including college students. The black 
working class contributions to combat discrimination in the city have been largely 
ignored.  I aim to fill this void by peeling another layer off of the “city too busy to 
hate” myth and adding historical agency to Atlanta’s African Americans other 
than the elite. 
This work will also be significant in that it enters two dynamic discussions 
in 1960s era scholarship.  It will add to emerging research on “the long civil rights 
movement,” which expands recognition of the movement from the 1940s through 
the 1970s.  While popular memory places the movement between the Brown v. 
Brown of Education decision in 1954 and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s death in 
1968,1 scholars are beginning to recognize both earlier and later activity that 
does not fit within these neat confines.  I argue that the organizing efforts of 
Atlanta’s workers belong within the story of the Civil Rights Movement.  They 
challenged their employers to abide by the protection won under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, by using similar tactics as those which originally secured 
the act.  The strikes involved some of the same leaders and veterans of major 
Civil Rights organizations, and are a direct continuation of their earlier work.   
                                                
1 Many historians consider the Voting Rights Act of 1965 a more accurate culminating point of the 
movement, since much movement activity and rhetoric took a more militant turn a that point;  but King’s 
death is generally considered the true death of the movement.  
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Additionally, I will challenge the “good sixties” versus ”bad sixties” model 
by examining one largely ignored outgrowth of the New Left, the New Communist 
Movement.2  I will explore one example of what happened when the liberal belief 
system of groups such as the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) evolved 
with the changing political atmosphere.  Many consider the group’s split in 1969 
the death of the New Left, and the violence and failure of the Weathermen a nail 
in its coffin.  There was another side of the split, though – those who aimed to 
overthrow capitalism by entering factories and organizing workers into a 
revolutionary communist movement, rather than participating in guerilla warfare – 
which eludes popular memory.  By considering their work, it becomes clear that 
“the sixties” did not end in the 1960s, but rather extended into the 1970s.  This 
wave of organizing in Atlanta will serve as a detailed case study of American 
communist groups during this era, focusing on the work of The October League. 
The first chapter examines Atlanta as the backdrop of the strikes.  It 
identifies a racially charged atmosphere, changing demographics and political 
shifts, and unequal economic conditions as contributing factors.  While I examine 
general contributing factors from the years leading up to 1972, my primary focus 
is on the period just prior to the outbreak of the flurry of labor unrest.  In this 
chapter, I also introduce the individuals, groups, and headlines that prove to be 
significant to the overall story.  Chapter two outlines the strike activity throughout 
the year.  Starting in January, workers began to walk out all over the city.  This 
                                                
2 The  “good sixties” versus “bad sixties” viewpoint is often attributed to Todd Gitlin’s book, The 
Sixties:  years of hope, days of rage, but it is a common perspective in popular memory as well. 
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chapter gives the details of the most significant strikes that occurred and omits 
more minor ones.  This chapter illustrates that Atlanta was a hotbed of protest 
activity throughout the year.  Chapter three examines what happened 
immediately after 1972’s labor unrest, tracing the activity of the primary strike 
leaders and groups.  It also examines changes that took place in Atlanta the 
following year, and suggests that the upheaval in 1972 was indicative of a 
transition period that ushered in a new era for the city.  The epilogue and 
conclusion explores the legacies and follows the trajectory of some of the 
participants.   
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Chapter 1 
Atlanta, a City in Transition 
 
 
 
Atlanta, Georgia has long been considered the capital of the American 
South.  Its relatively moderate race relations have earned it the designation, “the 
city too busy to hate.”  Though many scholars over the years have taken issue 
with this description, the overwhelming popular history of the city is one of 
moderation and compromise.   Atlanta’s elite and middle class, both white and 
black, tend to take center stage in literature written about the city’s Civil Rights 
era.  Prominent black citizens – ministers, businessmen, politicians, and even 
students at local prestigious historically black colleges – have been celebrated as 
people who were able to triumph against all odds.  Even Atlanta’s status as the 
national headquarters of major Civil Rights organizations like the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC) placed its activists among the leadership of 
regional and national efforts, rather than in local grassroots struggles.3  Images 
of relative success among black Atlantans have survived in our memories in 
stark contrast to that of desperation around the rest of the American South.   
In reality, however, the majority of blacks in Atlanta during the Civil Rights 
Movement were far from middle class.  Over half of all black men in the city were 
laborers and seventy five percent of black women were domestics, service 
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workers, or laborers.  At the beginning of the 1960s, the average black family 
earned less than half of the average white family.4  Lack of adequate affordable 
housing in rigidly segregated neighborhoods added to this economic gap.  
Additionally, the black working class in Atlanta endured blatant discrimination and 
racially hostile environments at work.  Despite the major victories of the Civil 
Rights Movement, this disparity continued and even widened in the early 1970s.  
While many whites and a select few blacks enjoyed increased access to 
opportunities, most blacks remained relatively poor.   
Atlanta’s black workers grew increasingly disgruntled as they recognized 
that they were being denied the rights for which many fought so hard during the 
Civil Rights Movement.  They began to employ lessons learned during the 
previous decade’s struggles as models for organizing against Jim Crow in the 
workplace.   By 1972, rising tension erupted into widespread labor unrest 
throughout the city.  With the support of veteran civil rights leaders and white 
Leftist sympathizers, Atlanta’s black workers built a movement in hopes of 
eliminating disparate treatment and unequal pay.   
An examination of the period leading up to 1972 reveals that this 
phenomenon – a series of strikes among black workers with similar grievances – 
was not spontaneous.  Evolving social and political climates clearly impacted the 
sentiment which led to these actions.  Prevailing political dialogue centered on 
racial issues, particularly as race related to economic disparity.  Before the series 
                                                
4 Virginia H. Hein.  “The Image of ‘A City too Busy to Hate’:  Atlanta in the 
1960s.  Phylon (1960-), Vol. 33, No. 3 (3rd Qtr., 1972) , pp. 217. 
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of strikes erupted, black workers collectively endured racism and unequal 
conditions, shared the experience of their grievances being ignored, and 
interacted with a network of supporters.  While the city’s business and civic elite 
remained confident their control would prevail, Atlanta’s black workers grew tired 
of waiting and weary of compromise.  All of these factors contributed to a 
charged, volatile atmosphere in which a diverse group of players came together 
in support of Atlanta’s workers.  I will argue that the holdover tensions of both the 
Civil Rights movement and New Left ideologies of the 1960s manifested among 
the workers and Atlanta’s activist community, and led to this unusual flurry of 
labor unrest.   
During the turmoil of the Civil Rights Movement, Atlanta’s leadership 
worked hard to maintain an image of moderation relative to that of other cities 
throughout the South.  When violent struggles for school desegregation in cities 
such as Little Rock, Arkansas, captured national interest, Mayor William 
Hartsfield and his supporters sought to avoid negative attention through careful 
planning.  When the media descended upon the Atlanta school district’s 
integration on August 30, 1961, they witnessed a peaceful process. President 
John F, Kennedy announced to the nation, “I strongly urge all communities which 
face this difficult transition… to look closely at what Atlanta has done.”5  The 
national press followed suit through wide positive coverage, and dubbed the city, 
“the leader of the New South.”  This image was upheld largely due to a nationally 
                                                
5 Quoted in Hein 207. 
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syndicated column, in which Atlanta Constitution editor, Ralph McGill urged law 
and order and relatively progressive race relations.  Additionally, Ivan Allen, Jr. 
was the only southern mayor to speak in favor of the Civil Rights Bill before 
Congress.6   
Atlanta’s image as “the city too busy to hate” became essential to the 
business elite’s plans for growth.  They recognized that investors would be 
deterred by racial violence and attracted to a positive image.  A 1968 article in 
Atlanta magazine described the city as “ready to set aside the uglier aspects of a 
bad social system and move on to newer ways.”  Advertisements in publications 
such as the New Yorker, Fortune, and the Wall Street Journal in the 1960s 
portrayed Atlanta as a vibrant place for business.  By mid-decade, Atlanta 
boasted the lowest unemployment rate in the country, a tremendous residential 
real estate boom, and eighty percent of the largest industrial corporations 
operated in some capacity there.7  The Atlanta Voice, a conservative black 
newspaper, was filled with articles about local blacks graduating from high school 
and area colleges, being hired into management positions, becoming doctors, 
getting appointed to political office, winning beauty pageants, and attending 
$100-a-plate fundraising events.  On the surface, Atlanta was a bustling town, full 
of progress and opportunity for both black and white residents. 
                                                
6 Hein 207-9. 
 
7 Ibid. 
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A shifting racial dynamic in Atlanta, however, threatened the white 
business elite’s longstanding control over the metropolis.  Blacks began to gain 
political clout, seeking and obtaining key offices in the city, while the political 
stronghold of whites began to slip.  During the 1960s, sixty thousand whites 
moved out of the city into the suburbs, while seventy thousand blacks moved into 
the city limits.8  By 1972, the black population in Atlanta had reached 54 percent.9  
Some felt threatened and some empowered by this development; and the ripple 
effects could be observed throughout the community.   
Politics 
 The demographic shift immediately impacted the way politics worked in 
Atlanta, which was a dramatic change from the way the local elite had run the 
city for decades.  Black and white business and political leaders maintained a 
steady relationship during the post-World War II era: 
From the beginning there was little opposition to registration of Negro 
voters in Atlanta; blacks feared no reprisals from registering and voting as 
they did in other parts of the state and the South.  Thus, Atlanta Negro 
voter registration showed the following growth:  3,000 (4.0 percent of total 
Atlanta registration) in 1946; 41,000 (27.6 percent) in 1961; 64,000 (35.8 
percent) in 1966; and 93,000 (44.8 percent) in 1969.10   
 
In the late 1940s, black leaders formed the Atlanta Negro Voters League to 
educate their community about local politics.  Through this organization, white 
                                                
8 Gary Pomeranz.  Where Peachtree Meets Sweet Auburn:  the saga of two 
families and the making of Atlanta.  New York:  Scribner, 1996. 
 
9 Ibid, 400. 
 
10 Hein 212. 
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leaders solicited and maintained black support through compromise.11  As former 
mayor Ivan Allen, Jr. noted, “For nearly two decades the black community had 
been a silent partner in the election of city officials in Atlanta, generally going 
along with whatever moderate candidate the white business and civic fathers 
endorsed.”12  It was through this approach that Atlanta earned a reputation for 
moderation.  By the late 1960s, however, some blacks had grown weary of this 
“silent partner” political status and began to break away from the long-
established practice. 
While the black vote had been vital in Atlanta’s elections since the 1940s, 
the growing percentage of black voters within the city limits increased their 
political muscle.  By 1969, black leadership exercised this strength by choosing 
for the first time to endorse a different mayoral candidate than the white business 
moderates.   Sam Massell, the reigning Vice Mayor, appealed directly to leaders, 
such as Martin Luther King, Sr., Leroy Johnson, and Jesse Hill, pledging to work 
on behalf of black Atlantans.13  Statistical analysis proved the power in numbers 
when reports revealed that Massell, in fact, had won the mayoral election 
because he received the majority of the black vote.  As Ronald Bayor points out 
in his book, Race and the Shaping of Twentieth Century Atlanta, this “represents 
                                                
11 Clarence N. Stone.  Regime Politics:  governing Atlanta, 1946-1988.  
Lawrence, Kansas:  University Press of Kansas, 1989. 
 
12 Ronald H. Bayor.  Race and the shaping of twentieth century Atlanta.  Chapel 
Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1996. 
. 
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an election where blacks were more assertive, breaking with their junior 
partnership role and moving toward an era of black political dominance.” 14  True 
to his campaign promises, Massell appointed blacks to some leadership roles 
within his administration, including the head of the personnel department and 
several aldermanic committees.  In spite of this, Massell did not allow his time in 
office to be constrained by indebtedness to the black community at large.  
When mostly black sanitation workers went on strike in 1970, he broke the 
strike, ignoring the fact that much of the black community’s leadership supported 
the workers.15    While city funds funneled into construction of a new airport, 
stadium, and civic center, the administration claimed that there was no room in 
the budget for a pay raise for its sanitation workers.16  Massell spoke out against 
the strikers and strongly resisted concessions.  This foreshadowed later 
departures from his campaign positioning, including a disappointing hiring record 
and failure to expand city services to the black community.   
Massell also appointed a police chief, John Inman, who was accused of 
discriminatory hiring practices and an uncooperative attitude towards police 
brutality charges.17  Police brutality continued to be a divisive issue, so much so 
that the Atlanta Community Relations Committee, headed by Andrew Young, 
                                                
14 Ibid. 43. 
 
15 Ibid. 44-45. 
 
16 Winston A. Grady-Willis.  “A changing tide:  black politics and activism in 
Atlanta, Georgia, 1960-1977.”  Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 1998. 
 
17 Bayor 45. 
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called for an in-depth study of how to handle complaints.18  A Fulton County 
Grand Jury Investigation in 1969, however, found that the incidents were isolated 
and did not represent a pattern of brutality.  Citizens knew differently and 
continued organizing efforts against the police force over the next few years to 
little avail until Maynard Jackson took office.  Atlanta’s black citizens did not view 
the police force as protectors, but rather agents working in support of the white 
establishment. 
Many local blacks felt most deceived when Massell took up the issue of 
annexation, proposing an increase in Atlanta’s geographic boundary as a remedy 
to the declining percentage of whites living within the city limits.  He told a black 
audience at the Butler Street YMCA, “the word around town is that you and I… 
the black and white liberal leadership of Atlanta, are committed to Atlanta 
becoming an all black city… what a terribly confined and costly ambition that 
would represent.”19  Then, when he spoke to white Rotary Club members later, 
he stated, “I spoke to the black community about the economic damage we could 
all suffer from our city going all black,“ and explained that development in the 
proposed annex would secure, “predominately white growth to maintain a 
competitive pace with the inner-city growth which is mostly black.”20  The mayor 
and his supporters worried about Atlanta’s possible decline should blacks gain 
                                                
18 “ACLU orders a study of police brutality,” Atlanta Daily World [hereafter cited 
as ADW], 28 May 1972. 
19 Pomerantz 394. 
 
20 “Sam Massel,”  The Great Speckled Bird [hereafter cited as GSB], 10 January 
1972. 
17 
majority political power, citing problematic situations in Newark and Los Angeles, 
where black mayors had been elected.  Overall, the way Massell approached 
race relations during his term in office disappointed the black leadership who 
initially backed him. Consequently, many concluded that it was time to support a 
black candidate in the next mayoral election.  
 This made room for the rise of Maynard Jackson, who entered Atlanta’s 
political scene in 1969 by winning the elected office of Vice Mayor.  Though he 
hailed from a reputable local black family, he had not lived in Atlanta long enough 
to cultivate relationships with the established black leadership. Positioning 
himself as an advocate for the people, Jackson sided against Massell for the 
city’s sanitation workers when they went on strike.  Formerly an attorney with the 
National Labor Relations Board, Jackson called a press conference, stating “I 
can no longer hold my peace…I am firmly convinced that this dispute can be 
settled and could and should have been settled, several weeks ago.”21  This 
helped to seal his support among the black community at large, the majority of 
whom identified with the striking garbage men.  Many Atlantans viewed him as a 
politician “for the people.”  Confident of support among the majority of the black 
population and progressive whites, Jackson decided to run for mayor in 1973.   
Not surprisingly, race was central to the campaign, which ran 
simultaneously to the labor unrest in 1972. Massell responded to Jackson’s 
candidacy with the campaign slogan, “Atlanta’s Too Young to Die,” implying that 
                                                
21 Pomerantz 393. 
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a black mayor would prove fatal to the city’s progress. 22  Jackson, conversely, 
emphasized the need for biracial unity and inclusion in his campaign strategy, 
aspiring for “a situation whereby grass-roots leaders, white and black, will be 
sitting alongside of persons who are quite wealthy, quite influential, and 
sometimes not as attuned as they need to be to what it is really like to be living 
close to disaster.”23  Statements like this resonated with much of the electoral 
base.  His strategy proved effective, as he won 95 percent of the black vote and 
17.5 percent of the white vote, securing victory as the first black mayor of Atlanta 
or any other Southern city.24 
In addition to city politics, Atlanta’s African Americans sought political  
representation in Washington as well.  With the support of prominent black 
leaders, veteran civil rights activist and long time SCLC member Andrew Young 
ran for Congress in 1970.  Though he lost the election, Young immediately 
planned to run again in the next campaign.  Following his defeat, his district was 
redrawn to his disadvantage; but the district modification was challenged and 
eventually rectified under protection of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  The 
revised district included a much more favorable demographic, with an increased 
black population and politically moderate white neighborhoods.   
                                                
22 Bayor 43. 
 
23 Stone 81. 
 
24 Bayor 48. 
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Mayor Sam Massell appointed Young as the chair of the Community 
Relations Commission.  Through this appointment, Young gained exposure 
throughout the city.  His responsibilities brought him in close contact with civic 
organizations and citizens groups, handling discrimination complaints against 
various institutions.  In his role on the Commission, Young stepped in to 
negotiate settlements for striking workers, further exposing him as a 
representative for black Atlantans. In this capacity, Young played a critical role in 
the events that unfolded throughout 1972.  In his autobiography, he specifically 
credited this experience as crucial to gaining understanding issues that would 
eventually help him win his next campaign.  “It was very good preparation for a 
congressional race,” he recalled.  “When I ran again, I knew a lot more about the 
politics of the collection of neighborhoods that were the city.”25  On November 7, 
1972, Andrew Young became the first black representative elected to Congress 
since Reconstruction.26  
Economics 
Many blacks in Atlanta faced daily battles against discrimination.  The 
problem of economic disparity was at the forefront of their agendas.  Little overall 
economic progress had been made since the early days of the Civil Rights 
Movement.  By the late 1960s, a study reported that the majority of blacks dealt 
with, “inadequate housing, poor municipal services, idleness, dirt, decay, 
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overcrowding, poor playground facilities or none at all, and poverty – always, 
endlessly, too little money.”27   
  Lack of access to affordable housing was another issue indicative of 
Atlanta’s racial tensions. In the previous decade, Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr.’s 
administration attempted a major urban renewal endeavor.  The plan included 
destruction of more than twenty thousand dilapidating housing units; however, 
over the next few years, less than a quarter were rebuilt.  This caused an 
extreme shortage of affordable housing in the city, and created conflict between 
its poor citizens and the political power structure.28  Black neighborhoods such as 
Peoplestown, Dixie Hills, Vine City, and Summerhill contained a disproportionate 
number of citizens living below the poverty line.29  Interrelated battles for equal 
education, safe and affordable housing, and fair employment erupted into intense 
struggles throughout Atlanta.  The protests that ensued illuminated the profound 
inequality suffered by black Atlantans.   
 In the summers of 1966 and 1967, conditions in the Summer Hill and Dixie 
Hills neighborhoods exploded into large-scale protests.  Hundreds of residents 
took to the streets, calling for “freedom” and “black power.”  While local SNCC 
leadership, including Stokely Carmichael, participated in rallying the crowd, the 
uprising was an organic result of slum conditions.  As historian Winston A. 
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Grady-Willis noted, the fear that it struck “forced the moderate Black leadership 
and its liberal White allies to confront finally the city’s poor Black majority.”30  
Many of the city’s poor were inspired by the actions that took place.  One 
participant, Columbus Ward, stated, “It was the beginning of my awakening in 
terms of protesting.  I’ve been liking protests ever since then.  If there was some 
injustice going on, I’ve had no problem protesting that injustice.”31  While the 
“riots” caused leadership to recognize some concerns, it also prompted them to 
be on guard and suspicious of so-called outside agitators.   
Residents of Bolton Garden Apartments began a movement to improve 
their housing conditions in 1969.  Led by Cora Towns, the tenants refused to pay 
rent until their demands were met.  Despite support by the Atlanta Legal Aid 
Society and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP), however, a judge ruled against the tenants and ordered them to pay all 
back rent.32    
The East Lake Meadows housing project was supposed to be part of the 
urban renewal solution.  The plan, which housed an average of 85 residents per 
square acre, instead became the center of turmoil.  The construction company 
assigned to the project, March Co., went bankrupt and left the complex 
incomplete and in disarray.  Despite this, the housing shortage made moving 
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tenants into the units unavoidable; however, the units were in terrible condition.  
An inadequate drainage system and leaky roofs flooded apartments, defective 
heaters caused fires, gas pipes were dangerously exposed, electric meters were 
broken, and street lights did not work. Additionally, rampant crime and dangerous 
conditions earned the neighborhood the nickname, “Little Vietnam.”   
In late 1971 residents formed groups, such as the Georgia Tenants 
Association (GTA), to address their concerns.  Some residents took a moderate 
approach, while others were more militant.   The GTA took over the rental office 
and went on a rent strike, hoping to force recognition of some of the problems 
they were having.33    Activists were still protesting at East Lake Meadows, Perry 
Homes, and elsewhere the following summer when the Atlanta Police 
Department promised protection for the Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA) workers 
in the rent office, who felt threatened.  The AHA issued a statement that read: 
In order to maintain our services, our staff must have access to our offices 
and shops and we request that you cease participating in illegal activities 
such as padlocking doors or other methods of preventing the staff from 
performing their duties.  The health and welfare of many people depend 
on their receiving necessary services…34 
 
The authorities claimed the protesters were uncooperative in trying to meet with 
them, while the protesters claimed the contrary.35  On July 15, 1972, a Fulton 
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County court placed a restraining order on the protesters36; but within a week, the 
local NAACP announced support for the tenants.37  By early August, negotiations 
resulted in some concessions, such as cosmetic improvements and the removal 
of abandoned vehicles from properties.38   
Affordable housing continued to be a race-based problem.  City officials 
faced difficulty finding solutions to the housing problem. Many of the city’s more 
affluent residents vehemently opposed less-dense housing options in their 
neighborhoods.  A resident at one community meeting stated, “We’ll all have to 
buy guns and dogs and we won’t be able to go to work and leave our wives and 
daughters home alone.”  Another worried, “You know how many children these 
people have, well that’s how many will be running the streets looking for trouble.”  
Conflicting sentiment among different groups illustrates the ubiquitous problem of 
race and class tensions in Atlanta during this era.39  
Education 
Despite the relatively peaceful symbolic integration a decade earlier, 
school desegregation remained a heated issue in the 1970s.  Debates illustrated 
a racially polarized community.  For Atlanta’s black citizens, access to equal 
education was an important concern.  Many placed hope in the young 
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generation’s potential to reap the benefits of the Civil Right Movement’s gains; 
and a good education was essential to achieve this.  Though legally integrated, 
schools in Atlanta remained segregated due to the demographic shift and forced 
residential concentrations.  By 1972, Atlanta’s city schools were 72 percent 
black, while the suburban counties enrolled no less than 90 percent white 
students.  Claiming that this undermined any attempt at true integration, 
Georgia’s chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit in a 
federal court.  The ACLU proposed a cross-county Metro-Atlanta school system, 
which would require extensive busing, to rectify the disparity.40  In October 1972, 
however, the local branch of the NAACP negotiated a unique compromise.  
Clearly facing a losing battle for integration, the agreement instead secured 
appointment of a black superintendent, and fifty percent of the top administration 
positions were reserved for blacks.41   
In accordance with movements around the country, Atlanta’s college 
campuses became sites for political action as well.  In addition to supporting the 
community at large, students at Emory, Georgia State, the Interdenominational 
Theological Seminary, Georgia Tech, and the Atlanta University Center, pushed 
for black studies programs in the late 1960s.  As part of the development of black 
studies programs, scholars at the Atlanta University Center founded a think tank 
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called the Institute of the Black World (IBW), comprised of “Black intellectuals 
who are convinced that the gifts of their minds are meant to be fully used in the 
service of the Black community.”   The group’s Statement of Purpose and 
Program goes on to explain “it is, therefore, an experiment with scholarship in the 
context of struggle.”42 Focused on intellectual pursuits, the scholars grappled with 
the notion that they “had to constantly live with the tension that we were trying to 
be a national and international organization at the same moment people in 
Atlanta, understandably and justifiably, were always asking us, ‘What are you 
doing in Atlanta?  What’s your program here?’”43   
The Activist Community 
 Atlanta’s diverse activist community recognized that the political, 
economic, and social upheaval in the city called for widespread organizing.  By 
the early 1970s, civil rights activists and leftists had over a decade of experience 
mobilizing against injustice.  Members of both groups acquainted themselves 
with mounting discontent among Atlanta’s black workers as it brewed against the 
backdrop of the racially charged city.  Ranging from Hosea Williams’ no-
nonsense provocation to theoretical appeals to join a global anti-imperialist 
struggle, local activists inspired workers to join forces and take action.  While the 
fight belonged to the workers themselves, activist involvement proved integral to 
their ability to successfully confront their employers.   
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 Veteran civil rights leader Hosea Williams stood at the forefront of the 
black community’s upheaval against inequitable economic conditions.  He had a 
long history of working on labor issues, which could be traced back to his youth 
in Savannah.  In 1964, he urged Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to become involved in 
the Scripto strike in Atlanta, and appealed to black leadership to focus on labor 
issues at local companies.  He explained: 
When the [Scripto] strike started, my job was to go into a situation 
and analyze that situation, and I would make recommendations 
with SCLC, how involved the SCLC would get.  But if the SCLC 
was going to get involved, it was my job as the field organizer, my 
chief talent was organizing, and my job [was] to really organize the 
maximum of this effort, and that’s exactly what I did.44 
 
Williams considered it his duty to continue King’s legacy by agitating for 
economic equality; and after King’s death, he used his organizing talents to 
attempt to build a poor people’s movement, starting in Atlanta. 
As Williams marched alongside Atlanta’s sanitation workers in 1970, he 
recognized both the symbolic and literal significance of this strike to Martin Luther 
King Jr.’s final work and legacy.  He was vocal in his dissatisfaction with Massell 
as well as black officials within his administration for selling the workers short.  
National representatives from their union, the American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), an AFL-CIO affiliate, negotiated 
with city officials for improved working conditions, a pay increase, and better 
benefits.   Led by Jesse Epps, the same union officer who had headed the 1968 
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Memphis sanitation strike, when Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated, 
the workers threatened to strike if their demands were not met.  Following failed 
negotiations, employees walked out on March 17, 1970, and remained on strike 
for thirty-six days.45  After the public endured rotten garbage and foul-smelling 
sewers for over a month, city officials finally conceded a lower raise, 
reinstatement of fired workers, and required residents to begin hauling their 
garbage to the streets rather than have workers retrieve it from their backyards.46   
In keeping with his interpretation of King’s perspective, Williams purported that 
episode illustrated the rift between “the rich and the poor, the haves and the 
have-nots.”47  Elimination of this rift became the focus of his work for the next few 
years. 
 In an effort to address some of the discriminatory economic issues black 
Atlantans faced, Williams called upon local activists to form an organization 
called the Black United Front in May 1972.   The group aimed to develop, 
organize, and implement ideas to improve conditions in the black community.  
They focused on economic development, arguing that “black Americans must 
understand that their major problem is not basically racial, it’s economic.”  Of the 
group, Williams stated that: 
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[T]he ones in attendance were young and militant.  Our greatest conflict 
was ideological, but they were willing and ready for action.  In no way do 
we represent the majority of Black Atlanta but we sure represent what part 
is unwilling to get bogged down in the analysis of the paralysis…We still 
feel if Black people are to ever be free, there must first be unity in the 
Black community.48 
 
Williams stood apart from Atlanta’s conventional black leadership in that he was 
willing to work with any organization or individual who shared his goals for 
improving the conditions of blacks in the city, and he did not allow his political 
affiliations or aspirations to subdue his words or actions. 
Having endured criticism from Atlanta’s more moderate black leaders for 
his brash, confrontational style, Williams was forced out of the national Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC).  The SCLC rejected any affiliation with 
the Black United Front, which had been meeting at Dr. Ralph David Abernathy’s 
West Hunter Street Baptist Church.  They were hesitant to support Williams’ 
participation in labor protests around the city, especially actions against black-run 
Citizens Trust Bank.   Williams’ branch broke off from the national organization in 
July 1972, and continued to operate independently as the Dekalb-Metro Atlanta 
SCLC.49 Abernathy continued to lead the national organization, while Williams 
and his chief supporter, Tyrone Brooks, resolved to address local issues.   
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Of the split, Williams later recalled, “that’s when I said I’m going to start a 
movement in Atlanta, and I started one.”50  He viewed the historical moment to 
be ripe for economic justice.  Operating out of donated office space at Reverand 
William Holmes Borders’ church, Williams began a concerted effort to target 
economic problems in the community.  He had a long history working with labor 
issues, and saw to it that he was involved in all of the action.  His experience 
proved crucial during the strikes of 1972, as he played a key role in mobilizing 
and organizing workers throughout the city.  He kept the momentum going with a 
weekly “People’s Rally” every Saturday, which aimed to bring the black 
community together to “challenge and convert the power structure in Atlanta.”51  
At these rallies, workers discussed unfair treatment in the workplace and spoke 
out against their employers, an attitude which revealed similar grievances and 
fostered a sense of common struggle.52  The workers respected Williams, which 
they displayed through a popular chant, “Hose, what do you say?  Hose, what do 
you say?  Ho- Ho- Ho- Hose!”53 
In addition to the civil rights community, a diverse array of progressive 
activists participated in organizing efforts.   While many were not politically active, 
it is worth noting that Atlanta hosted a lively hippie community in the late 1960s 
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and early 70s.  In an area downtown, adjacent to the corner of Peachtree and 
10th streets, lived youth described by New York Times writer James Wooten as 
“gay, gaudy carnival, noisy and naughty and with all the makings of a Greenwich 
Village South.”  The section of town referred to as “the Neighborhood,” “The Tight 
Squeeze,” “The Hip Strip” or a number of other names, was attractive because of 
cheap rent and a convenient location.  “The youth revolution was rolling full 
steam,” Wooten noted; “and the word spread that Atlanta was a free city, that 
their thing could be done there, and the disciples of the new lifestyle began 
pouring in…”  By 1970, five thousand hippies called this area home.  Their 
alternative lifestyle provoked police harassment.  Over time, tension mounted 
until a routine arrest ruptured into a riot in Piedmont Park.  Eventually the hippies 
dispersed into other areas of town, especially Little Five Points, the blocks 
surrounding the intersection of Moreland and Euclid Avenues.54  Within this 
group of free-spirited young people lived a significant portion of Atlanta’s young 
progressive white activist community. 
Some of these local progressives founded an underground newspaper, 
The The Great Speckled Bird in 1968.  The Bird served the hippie community by 
advertising concerts and events, and by printing other useful information such as 
cheap recipes and classifieds.  More significantly, the paper reported material 
from an unapologetically leftist perspective.  It covered protests, rallies, meetings, 
and strikes, which other local media often avoided.  Its all volunteer staff 
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published weekly issues which critiqued local, national, and international events.  
The paper was sold in locations throughout the city and country and served as an 
outlet and communication tool for activist organizations in Atlanta.  During the 
labor unrest of 1972, The The Great Speckled Bird provided the broadest 
coverage.   
Some leftists in Atlanta traveled internationally to see the Marxist theories 
they admired at work.  In May 1972, a delegation, including Atlanta-based black 
leftists Rick Reed of the Atlanta Black Workers Congress and Candy Watson of 
the International Institute for Labor Studies, traveled to China to view 
Communism in practice and express solidarity with the people of China.  Watson 
stated: 
As a black person who is about struggle and committed to struggle in this 
country, the experience reaffirmed my commitment to return to the U.S. 
and struggle harder and more realistically.  The abstract of socialism has 
become real.  I have experienced it. My enthusiasm and confidence 
confirmed, I am certain of a people’s victory in this country.  It can and will 
be a reality. 
 
She went on to explain, “as the struggle progresses the racism of poor whites will 
die, as they realize their own humanity, and the fact that they are being 
dehumanized just like blacks.”    Reed expressed the view that “since the death 
of Martin Luther King, Jr. American blacks and other minorities had lost their 
direction in the struggle for liberation.”  He felt that it was important for those who 
had traveled to China to report back to the black community about the Chinese 
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people’s way of life to spread hope for the future. 55  The group returned 
invigorated, and hoped to spread their enthusiasm for what they considered a 
better way of life than that endured by Atlanta’s working class.  
Travelers to Cuba also brought back experiences they hoped would 
inspire workers to adopt a positive opinion of Marxist ideas.  An article in the The 
Great Speckled Bird entitled, “Cuba, Work Here & There:  the difference in 
FACTORY WORK,” focused on the cleanliness, efficiency, pride, and safety 
witnessed on a tour of a tin can plant in Havana.  The article outlined what the 
author viewed as benefits Cuban workers had that the American working class 
was lacking -  safety, security, and dignity on the job - and attempted to paint 
socialism in a way that would appeal to workers.  The piece quotes a Cuban 
factory employee as stating, “The best thing is being given consideration and 
respect, no longer being considered a part of the machine, but as a living being.”  
Other perceived benefits to socialist societies mentioned in the article included 
free health care and childcare, the rent cap at ten percent of wages earned, and 
paid retirement and disability.56   The author hoped this depiction of the Cuban 
way of life after the peoples’ revolution would spark workers in America, and 
more specifically Atlanta, to be persuaded to organize.  
 Many activists viewed the black working class struggle as part of a global 
anti-imperialist fight.  Atlanta’s labor unrest in 1972 occurred against the 
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backdrop of continuous US involvement in Vietnam.  As President Richard Nixon 
escalated the war in May 1972, Atlanta’s anti-war movement, which had been 
dormant for three years, was reborn.  Some of the same people who were 
involved in the strikes marched against the war.  Echoing sentiments of some of 
the early Civil Rights Movement’s World War II veterans, black Vietnam veterans 
spoke out at a rally at the state capitol about “the plight of the returning Black GI 
who expects to find work at home, but instead finds only the same prejudice, 
unemployment, poor housing and wages which he left.”57   
A diverse group of students, workers, leftists, and independent activists 
who shared anti-war sentiments formed groups called the Atlanta Peace Action 
Coalition and the Atlanta Coordinating Committee to unite efforts against the 
war.58   They saw the war as “a logical extension of past politics and present 
nature of American society… intimately related to other wrongs and injustices in 
our society – racism sexism, poverty, oppression and exploitation.”59 The rhetoric 
had evolved from that of marches in previous years.  An article in The The Great 
Speckled Bird reported that “one woman kept trying to get people singing ‘Give 
Peace a Chance’ but others would immediately drown her out with much more 
militant slogans.”  Among other sayings, they chanted, “Poor Man’s Fight; Rich 
Man’s War!” “1-2-3-4 We Don’t Want Your Racist War!” “5-6-7-8 Organize to 
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Smash the State!”60  Leftist organizations were highly visible in the new coalition, 
the same groups who were participating in Atlanta’s labor unrest.  Leftists 
emphasized what they considered a link between corporate interests in Vietnam 
and corporate opposition to workers’ struggles in America at meetings, and urged 
contingents of workers to participate in anti-war rallies.  “[Black] workers were 
definitely involved in the anti-war thing,”  strike participant Gary Washington 
recalled.  He echoed the sentiment of many by stating, “I had no problem with the 
people in Vietnam.  I had a problem with the management at [my job].”61 
Having witnessed some of the activity in Atlanta, radical Leftists sought to 
seize an opportunity for organizing in the South.  The mass movements for civil 
rights, workers’ rights, and against war and imperialism sparked hope among 
Marxists that the time was right to recruit workers for a genuinely revolutionary 
communist party.  As detailed in Max Elbaum’s Revolution in the Air:  Sixties 
Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao, and Che, a New Communist Movement was 
underway.  Tracing its roots to Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the 
New Left, the New Communist Movement held the labor organizing and party 
building efforts of the Old Left in high regard.  The local efforts of New 
Communist groups such as the Progressive Labor Party (PL) and the Georgia 
Communist League (Marxist-Leninist) attracted white Marxists from surrounding 
states.62  Leftist organizers all over the South set their sights on Atlanta.  They 
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abandoned labor organizing efforts in locations such as Greensboro, North 
Carolina, to join forces with like-minded Atlanta-based activists.63   “We went to 
Atlanta because that’s really where the action was in the South in the 
movement,” recalled former participant John Fletcher.   
The October League (Marxist-Leninist) was one such organization heavily 
involved in the strike activity.  It was comprised of mostly white members of the 
Los Angeles-based Revolutionary Youth Movement II and the Georgia 
Communist League.64  The groups united in May 1972 around a shared belief in 
the principles of Marxism-Leninism- Mao Tsetung Thought, and aspired to 
revolution through party building.  According to their literature, members strongly 
believed that the world was ripe for revolution at this point in history, and they 
sought to ride the wave of struggle sweeping the globe.   
The Statement of Political Unity of the Georgia Communist League (M-L) 
and the October League (M-L) revealed that the members possessed a keen 
understanding of the enormity of the task ahead.  The OL considered it critical to 
take advantage of rising activity among the masses, and educate people about 
the larger context of global workers’ struggles.  They sought to partner with 
Atlanta’s workers to implement their theories and build their party, but also with 
an earnest interest in improving the workers’ conditions: 
                                                
63 John Fletcher, interview by author, 31 October 2004, Leeds, AL, video 
recording. 
64 Max Elbaum.  Revolution in the Air:  Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao and 
Che.  New York:  Verso, 2002. 
36 
It is necessary for us at this time to go deep among the masses at the 
factories and in the communities in order to unite with the advanced 
workers and to keep clear of idealism and all types of thinking which do 
not coincide with objective reality. 
 
They feared that if they missed the opportunity to educate the masses in their 
ideology, they would win only isolated victories.  The key was to capture the 
energy directed against particular grievances or towards particular freedoms and 
expand the consciousness of those affected.  The OL realized that they had to 
make their ideology fit each situation.  
 Members believed it was important to form a new communist party in the 
tradition of the old Communist Party USA and felt that revisionists were 
reformists and opportunists.  They were able to garner the support of notable 
members of the “Old Left” such as Harry Haywood and Otis Hyde.  They also 
successfully recruited a local communist Nanny Washburn.  Born into a family of 
poor white sharecroppers in Douglasville, Georgia, at the turn of the century, 
Washburn became a communist during the early days of The Great Depression, 
inspired by a Communist-led textile strike.  She worked as an organizer during 
the Angelo Herndon trial in Atlanta in the 1930s and for the campaign to defend 
the Scottsboro Boys.  From the beginning, she believed, “I knew that by 
supporting the Black people’s struggle I was helping myself.  I won’t be free until 
all of us are free.”  Washburn organized all throughout the Cold War years, 
despite the thread of McCarthyism, and never wavered in her support for 
communism and for civil rights.  Aware that she was in Atlanta, the October 
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League approached her.  Of them, she stated, “A lot of people can say they’re 
communist, but I watched all the time to see if they meant it.  And these young 
people seemed to mean it.  I went to pickets and strikes with them.  I went to a 
study group, and joined the October League.”65  An elderly Washburn could be 
found at factory gates handing out newspapers and on the picket lines 
throughout the labor unrest in 1972. 
 One rallying point around which a diverse array of leftist and civil rights 
activists organized was the trial of Henry Whitlock.  Whitlock, a Ford factory 
employee, was convicted of killing a white police officer in January 1971.  The 
defense claimed that Whitlock had been harassed by the police for driving a 
shiny sports car and dating a white woman.  He was severely beaten and shot 
during his arrest.  Despite contradictory evidence, an all white jury convicted the 
twenty-four year-old and he was sentenced to death.   
Concerned citizens, including members of the Black Panther Party’s local 
chapter, formed an organization called the People’s Committee to Insure Justice 
(PCIJ), which called for an investigation into the case, backed up by a petition 
with more than eighteen thousand signatures.  The group’s newsletter, “People’s 
Message” stated, “[a]n anti-repression organization is necessary because of the 
increasing repression and move toward facism [sic] that is existing in this 
country.”  The group also urged, “[m]ass mobilizations are the most effective 
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means of impeding or stopping the moves of the state.”66  During a rally held at 
East Lake United Methodist Church, Jim Forman, representing the Black 
Workers Congress stated:   
We must organize and struggle against injustice and oppression.  The 
profit motive makes people think they must exploit others and provides no 
real upward mobility for blacks.  We must organize and work together, not 
individually.  The system of capitalism depends on wars, exploitation, 
hunger, and injustice…  We can look forward to a new world where 
Whitlock does not work at GM, but controls GM along with his fellow 
workers, a world that is not a world of napalm and Rockefeller.67 
 
Reminiscent of lynching cases of the Jim Crow south – a black man targeted due 
to real or alleged interaction with a white woman – the Whitlock case struck a 
chord with some Atlantans, and gained many sympathizers.  The fact that he was 
a GM worker involved in plant organizing allowed activists to connect community 
and workplace issues.  Thus the Whitlock case a galvanized blacks and 
progressive whites.68  Seizing upon this, early October League literature 
references the Whitlock case as an urgent reason to mobilize.  “Thousands of 
people have already signed petitions and attended rallies and benefits for Henry 
Whitlock,” a OL newspaper stated in June.  “People are beginning to see that the 
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capitalist system, which produces injustices like the Whitlock case, must be 
overthrown.”69 
 It was within this complex political climate and with the help of a diverse 
assortment of activists that labor unrest developed in Atlanta in 1972.  While 
Atlanta’s working class obviously never fully embraced the idea of overthrowing 
the capitalist system, many wanted to end unfair conditions.  With memories and 
many of the actors of the 1960s alive and well, workers possessed the spirit, thhe 
tools, and the network of support needed to take action.  As former SNCC activist 
and strike participant Nan Grogan Orrock explained, the strikes were a “natural 
outgrowth of over a decade of Civil Rights activism.”70  She recalled that because 
of the decade of movement, an increasing number of people became more 
inclined to stand up against discrimination.  Reflecting back, Orrock considered 
the strikes that occurred in Atlanta during 1972 “emblematic of… the sweep of 
history of that period.”  Absent of union support, it was recent history that gave 
birth to the courage necessary to put their jobs and security on the line.  “You 
could see how the Civil Rights Movement – that dynamic – informed the 
consciousness of the ordinary people who were working in shops, and were up 
against yet another manifestation of racism…” 
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Workers were community members who experienced discrimination on 
many levels.  They were also political actors who elected officials and interacted 
with those working to make progress.  Influenced by rapid changes in their 
community, while facing stagnant conditions at work, restlessness was inevitable.  
Participants in history, it was time for workers to benefit from the gains won by 
the Civil Rights Movement and become a part of the change that was going on all 
around them.  A careful examination of the events of 1972 reveals how the 
interplay between various characters in this forgotten period of Atlanta’s history 
adds to our understanding of the long Civil Rights Movement and answers the 
question of what happened to at least one sector of the New Left. 
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Chapter 2 
Strike Fever 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 granted equal employment 
opportunity, outlawed discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin, and created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to 
administer the guidelines.71 As was the pattern throughout the civil rights 
movement, however, the realization of rights was not achieved simply through 
legal victory.  In reality, discriminatory employment practices were still rampant in 
the early 1970s.  As companies were forced to integrate, management was often 
resistant and black workers bore the brunt of their resentment. Even after gaining 
the legal right to equal employment, black workers had to continue to agitate in 
order to make fair and gainful working rights a reality.    
In 1972, Atlanta was still adjusting to the changes that had come about as 
a result of the Civil Rights Movement.  Some of the area’s major employers had 
just begun to employ more black workers, and management, often reluctantly, 
was forced to deal with this change.  For many white supervisors and workers, 
this was their first job off of their family’s rural farms, and they were not 
accustomed to intermingling with blacks.  Opposition to an integrated workforce 
sometimes manifested into discriminatory practices – blacks men and women 
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Were called “boy” or “girl,” they were concentrated in dangerous or menial jobs, 
typically forced to work on the night shift, did not receive promotions, and were 
commonly fired for little or no reason.72  Inspired by gains of the prior decade, 
however, many blacks were no longer willing to accept this kind of treatment.  
The flurry of strikes that occurred in 1972 cannot be attributed to a single 
catalyst.  The events developed within a politically volatile, racially charged 
climate, and evolved from ongoing frustration with discriminatory practices, 
unsafe working conditions, and an allegedly corrupt power structure in the city 
and at the companies.  The workers were fed up with management’s inequitable 
conduct, and they were no longer willing to accept substandard treatment.73  
From the outset, racial discrimination was the central issue at hand.  While all 
involved continuously called for a unification of the working class and urged white 
participation, white and black workers remained largely polarized throughout the 
struggles.  One of the few white organizers recalled, “A lot of the white workers 
were reluctant to go out on strike to support demands that they saw as being 
black in nature….  The white workers who might have been pro-union, who might 
have gone out on strike under different circumstances, did not support it…  I think 
it was seen as a black thing. “74 
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In addition to the workers themselves, several political actors discussed in 
the previous chapter played an integral role throughout the year’s activities.  
Hosea Williams and what became known as the Metro-Atlanta/Dekalb branch of 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) could be seen on the 
picket lines in each of the strikes.  He often served as a representative for the 
workers.  He used his organizing skills to mobilize workers and his celebrity and 
brash style to attract media attention.  Williams’s involvement represented a 
tangible connection to the Civil Rights Movement, as he aimed to carry out what 
he interpreted as Martin Luther King’s legacy.  Members of the October League 
and other Leftist groups, in many cases, contributed to the strike efforts as well.  
Through giving financial support, joining picket lines, and disseminating 
information in pamphlets and newspapers, their contributions played an 
important role in furthering the workers’ cause.  Their participation links Atlanta’s 
strikes added to a long continuum of leftist organizing in America, serving as a 
rare example of open and admitted communist involvement in civil rights-related 
efforts. In his role as the Chairman of the Community Relations Commission, 
Andrew Young often served as mediator in strike negotiations.  As he recalled in 
his autobiography,  
It so happened that during [1972] there were a series of unusual wildcat 
strikes in Atlanta at the Mead Packaging Company, Sears Roebuck, and 
Nabisco plants.  In each of these strikes racial discrimination was a key 
factor.  A group of young white socialists had obtained jobs at these 
factories and were instrumental in raising issues of long-standing racism 
that were as critical of the unions as the employers.75    
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When management refused to recognize Williams or ad-hoc employee 
organizations, Young stepped in as the moderate liaison between strikers and 
the company.  He did not side with the workers, but rather endeavored to operate 
as a conciliator on a non-partisan basis.  His input demonstrated a changing of 
the guard, for some former civil rights movement participants were shedding their 
roles as so-called outside agitators and beginning to operate within the system. 
The interesting dynamic of all of their contributions can be seen throughout the 
year’s events.  
The year opened with a strike at the Fulton Cotton Mills in downtown 
Atlanta.  On January 3, 1972, more that twenty machine operators walked out in 
support of two co-workers who had been dismissed for requesting a salary 
increase.  Others joined them as they stayed out of work in protest for over a 
week.  Black and white workers maintained the picket lines, carrying signs that 
displayed messages such as “Fired For Trying To Make Our Children A Decent 
Living.”  On January 10, as many as one fourth of the workers joined them on the 
picket line in a one-day sympathy strike.76  In addition to low wages, the workers 
cited safety concerns and problems with supervision.  They received support 
from Operation Breadbasket, a division of the Southern Christian Leadership 
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Conference (SCLC) and the Georgia Communist League; however, the workers, 
who were not unionized, represented themselves in negotiations.   
The company’s president, Meno Schoenbach, claimed that a wage 
increase was “simply not feasible” economically, despite the fact that the 
company’s newsletter reported that profit had quadrupled in the last half of the 
1960s.  Schoenbach defend his stance by claiming, “My track record speaks for 
itself… I am not against unions and union organizing.  I am ready to meet with 
any individual.  Our policy has always been to talk to anyone.”  Yet he went on to 
vehemently oppose the legitimacy of SCLC’s involvement and firmly stated, “I am 
perfectly capable of running the FCM; I don’t tell the SCLC how to run their 
organization and I do not expect to be told how to run mine.”77  After continued 
pressure, management finally met with leaders and negotiated some 
improvements for the workers. 
In mid-February, workers began demonstrating at Holy Family Hospital in 
downtown Atlanta.  Employees accused the hospital of racist employment 
practices.  Though approximately ninety percent of the patients and doctors at 
the hospital were black, the majority of management, clerical employees and 
trustees were white.78 After trying to organize a union to address race-related 
grievances, twelve black employees were laid off for their actions on March 13.79  
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On March 23, when four of the fired women attempted to approach hospital 
administration, the administrator immediately called the police, and though they 
agreed to leave, they were arrested.  The demands were minimal – 
reinstatement of their jobs with back pay, a meeting with hospital administrator 
Nichols, and a new fair election be held for the employee representative 
committee.  Management, however, refused to negotiate or even acknowledge 
any of the strike participants or representatives.80  On 20 April, Nichols had some 
of the strikers arrested again.  The following day, they began to picket in front of 
C&S Bank, whose vice-president Paul F. Brown was also Holy Family’s board 
chairman.81   
Local activists organized strike support, enlisting the participation of local 
civil rights leaders.  Seven weeks into the strike, Williams, Rev. Joe Boone of the 
Metro Atlanta Leadership Conference, Al McClure of the NAACP, and Rev. 
Arthur Langford of the Free For All Baptist Church began a public fast and prayer 
vigil in support of the striking nurse-staff.  “We don’t consider this a drastic 
measure,“ Boone proclaimed.  “We are following in the footsteps of Rev. Martin 
Luther King.  We are taking the necessary step to drive the devil out of Holy 
Family Hospital.” 82  The civil rights leaders raised a tent on the hospital grounds, 
in which they led prayers, read the Bible, and consumed only salt water. Their 
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actions and rhetoric were intended to resonate with the black community by 
evoking a common set of beliefs and reminding them that the vision of the civil 
rights movement had not yet been realized.    
An eruption of violence brought about action that eight weeks of picketing 
at Holy Family Hospital could not deliver.  Opposition to the demonstration 
exploded on April 27, when Rev. Langford and long-time SNCC organizer Willie 
Ricks were shot and wounded during an evening demonstration.83  An 
anonymous caller to police incorrectly reported, “two dead niggers down there.”  
While their injuries were not life-threatening, the incident understandably caused 
great alarm in the community.  As a result of the shooting, the news media, local 
politicians, and mainstream black leadership suddenly acknowledged the strike’s 
significance.   
Even anti-imperialist activists from the World Conference of Churches 
Commission on Racism, in town for a Methodist convention, stopped by to 
“express solidarity from a similar situation” that they were facing in African 
liberation struggles.  The representative informed the crowd about what was 
going on in Africa, particularly racial oppression and violence under the white 
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minority regime in Rhodesia.  “Our enemy is organized internationally, and we 
have to organize internationally too,” he insisted.  Williams agreed, recounting his 
recent travels.  “They don’t want us to go to Cuba, to China.  They’re afraid of 
what we might find out.  In China I saw it was possible for everyone to have 
work.”  Williams also “explored the sophistication of white America in getting the 
best educated blacks working for Gulf Oil, the major exploiter in Angola.”  A Bird 
journalist reported that audience members felt “that their support of twelve 
women striking at Holy Family Hospital was supporting a worldwide liberation 
movement, and that’s the kind of thing we don’t often have in Atlanta.”  Emotions 
ran high that day, cementing widespread support for the strikers and increased 
opposition to the Holy Family administration. 84 
Within a week of the shooting, mounting pressure finally resulted in a 
settlement, negotiated by Rev. Andrew Young’s Community Relations 
Commission.  On Tuesday, May 3, the hospital’s board of trustees met with the 
representative organization to deliberate over employee grievances. They agreed 
to rehire six of the laid off workers, denying the others based on alleged 
misdemeanors committed during the strike.  They would receive back pay from a 
donation fund rather than the hospital.  The board also considered testimony by 
the Atlanta Police Department, alleging that hospital administrator Lee Nichols, 
comptroller Homer Bresendine, and Mrs. G. Yarian, their executive secretary, 
had prior knowledge of the shooting, and therefore suspended them, pending 
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further investigation.  Additionally, trustees consented to hold a vote in which 
employees could choose between forming a grievance committee and joining a 
labor union.  Leaders considered these concessions a victory for the workers.  
Williams stated, “The Holy Family victory should say to the power structure of 
Atlanta that poor people won’t take it anymore.85 
When Church’s Fried Chicken in East Lake Meadows, a black 
neighborhood in Atlanta, replaced a black manager with a white man in May, all 
of the employees walked out on their own accord and began picketing.86  Led by 
community activist Eva Davis, they took their grievances to other area locations 
and solicited the cooperation of their workers as well.  With SCLC’s support and 
financial pressure resulting from the black community’s boycott, all ten local 
stores were eventually closed.  Students at the Atlanta University Center 
picketed in solidarity with the workers at the location nearest campus.     At least 
one demonstration erupted in violence as white policemen beat up Donald 
Denson, a black Morris Brown student, and Andrew Mackey, a Morris Brown 
graduate and former policeman.  When Denson was refused bail, 200 students, 
led by Williams, marched from campus to the Fulton County Jail, and he was 
released on bond.  Since much of Church’s profit relied on the patronage of the 
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black community, they agreed to negotiations quickly.87  Because of the 
community’s financial power and support, the workers were able to win 
significant improvements in employment conditions according to the settlement 
announced on May 16.88   
On April 10, five black women at black-owned Citizens Trust Bank 
requested a moderate pay raise, were refused an increase, and fired on May 19.  
Civil rights leaders immediately sought to negotiate with management, but were 
refused.89   Though some black leadership hesitated to support action against a 
black-owned business, strike participants and supporters viewed the strike as a 
class issue.  One strike leader claimed that “black business men who have made 
it don’t identify or associate with us.”90  Once the civil rights organizations made 
their decision to back the workers, they had the support of the Metro Atlanta 
Summit Leadership Conference (MASLC) and the SCLC’s Operation 
Breadbasket.  They made picket signs, accusing the bank of racism, in the 
hallway of the Tabernacle Baptist Church, and enjoyed support by the 
community.91  By the end of July, picketers began targeting board member’s 
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businesses and homes, and arrests escalated.92  With this added pressure, an 
agreement was finally negotiated  by the MASLC after sixteen weeks.93 
On June 18, workers at the Regency Hyatt House hotel went out on strike 
to protest discrimination against blacks, Latin Americans, and women.  The 
workers had been organizing for three months to contest what they considered 
an unfair union contract.  The union announced that they were not associated 
with the group, which called themselves Regency Workers United.  Since the 
actions were considered a wildcat strike, the hotel filed for an injunction with the 
National Labor Relations Board, and four strikers were fired.94  Though many of 
the workers walked out in support of the strike, few joined the demonstrations.  
Support was solicited from a nearby anti-war demonstration, which tipped off 
police to possible leftist support.95  Though minor, this strike was the first in which 
the October League claimed direct involvement. 
In mid-July, striking workers targeted all local area Sears department 
stores and distribution centers to protest discriminatory practices against blacks.  
On July 17, Nathaniel Dunn, who had four years of tenure with the company, led 
his fellow co-workers at a Sears warehouse in the north Atlanta suburb of 
Chamblee on a walk-out.  The employees presented their manager, Allen Creer, 
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with a list of demands.  Within a week, the majority of black Sears workers in 
Atlanta walked off in support of their grievances.  Since they were geographically 
dispersed throughout the city, organizers held regular meetings at Wheat Street 
Baptist Church to keep all participants abreast of progress. 96  On Sunday, July 
23, a group of demonstrators marched from Martin Luther King’s burial site to the 
Sears store in the West End area of Atlanta, near the Atlanta University Center.  
The following day, demonstrators held a rally in front of the West End store, 
where they read and distributed a document entitled “Black Manifesto,” in which 
workers outlined a call to end historically discriminatory practices at Sears.97   
Workers threatened nationwide action if their local grievances were not 
resolved.98  Beginning the following day, all of the Sears locations around the city 
were picketed during all three shifts.  As many as thirteen participants were 
arrested during the demonstrations, most of whom were charged with the “Safe 
Streets and Sidewalks” ordinance. In a well-coordinated effort, employees were 
able to put enough pressure on management to win a settlement within eleven 
days.  Sears’ Southeastern Regional Vice President, A.D. Swift, agreed to meet 
with the strikers and their representatives.  After fourteen hours of negotiation, all 
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parties reached an agreement.99  Having won significant improvements, the 
Atlanta SCLC considered the Sears strike to be the “largest and most significant 
human rights movement in Atlanta since the death of our late beloved leader Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.”100  Finally, Williams was able to see what he considered 
King’s legacy gathering momentum.   
Newspapers reported that settlement of this racial labor dispute was the 
greatest victory for Black people in Atlanta since the passage of the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act.101  By all accounts, the Sears, Roebuck & Company strike resulted in 
a victory.  Company officials signed a covenant with the SCLC that confirmed the 
protection of over thirty benefits.  According to this agreement, not only were 
employees protected from blatant discrimination, but they also received other 
important well-deserved employment privileges.  For example, the company 
agreed to recognize Martin Luther King’s birthday as a holiday.  Even more 
beneficial to the workers, the overall racial distribution was to be systematically 
corrected through adherence to Affirmative Action guidelines.102    Tyrone Brooks 
reported that the Atlanta SCLC would work directly with Sears’ management to 
ensure that the agreement was executed. 103 Williams clearly expected that this 
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strike would set a precedent for further gains in Atlanta workers’ struggle.  “It 
would be a shame to convert Sears,” he said, “ and let the others get away.”104 
Racist practices at the Nabisco plant in the West End neighborhood of 
Atlanta also sparked a wildcat strike.  Unlike most factories in the South, the 
plant had been organized by the national Bakers and Confectioners Local #42 
since the Great Depression, and many workers enjoyed relatively high wages 
compared to other employers around the city.  However, Nabisco was also guilty 
of historic discrimination against black workers, and the long-established union 
was resistant to changing with the times.   In August, employee Fred White was 
fired for insubordination for taking an unauthorized bathroom break.  White had 
earned seniority and gained the respect and loyalty of his coworkers through 
years of service, and Joe Gallagher, the supervisor who fired him, had a 
reputation for racist attitudes toward black people.  The second unfair dismissal 
of a black employee in a month, this event instigated action by frustrated 
workers. When the night shift was over, a handful of workers gathered in a back 
room at Paschal’s restaurant, a black owned establishment that had been the 
location of countless civil rights meetings over the previous decade, to decide 
upon a course of action.  Encouraged by shop steward Doug Gray, the group 
immediately committed to taking a stand. The dismissals had been the final 
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straw.  They appointed a steering committee, including long-time SNCC activist 
Nan Grogan Orrock. 105   
Under the name Coalition for Constructive Change, leaders approached 
management with a list of demands.  Their grievances ranged from the indignity 
of being called “boy” or “girl” by their supervisors and charges of unfair promotion 
practices to being served food left over from the day shift during the evening, 
when most of the black employees were scheduled to work.106 When both 
management and the union refused to negotiate, two hundred fifty employees - 
nearly all of the black workers and a few whites - walked out.107  An information 
sheet distributed by the strike committee the following week announced that “We 
are dues paying members of Local #42 of Bakery and Confectionary Workers, 
AFL-CIO.  So far the union officials refuse to support the strike in any way.  They 
stood by and watched Nabisco fire Fred White, just as they have stood by in the 
past.”  Organizers told workers that the union had abandoned them and that they 
should stick together and provide support to each other.  This language sought to 
reassure strikers and supporters that their actions, although illegal according to 
their union contract, were, indeed, legitimate.108 
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Since locally produced Nabisco products, such as Oreos, Cheese Nips, 
and Vanilla Wafers sold in area grocery stores, organizers recognized the 
potential economic impact community support could make.  They distributed 
information to shoppers and called for a citywide boycott.   One information sheet 
read, “Black Nabisco workers need your support…  DON’T BUY NABISCO 
PRODUCTS!!!”109  They also asked stores throughout the city not to stock the 
merchandise.  During this era of volatility, the black community at large was 
generally supportive of activism; and as Nan Grogan Orrock recalled, reaction to 
this call “in black neighborhoods with mainly black shoppers was massively 
responsive.” 
Reverend Joseph Boone of the Metro Atlanta Summit Leadership 
Conference (MASLC), Reverend W.J. Stafford of the Free For All Baptist Church, 
and the community at large showed support for the workers.  Marjorie Jordan 
reported in The Bird that groups of picketers were “taking turns carrying signs 
and walking, dancing, singing, laughing, and making their presence felt in front of 
Nabisco.”110   Workers fully recognized that their actions were part of a larger 
phenomenon taking place in the city.  
We know workers all over Atlanta are fighting to better their conditions.  
The strikes at Mead, Citizens Trust, Sears, Pix Shoes, The Regency and 
elsewhere show that Black and working people are ready to stand up and 
fight back.  We must walk hand-in-hand and support each other.111 
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This acknowledgment invigorated workers, helped to validate what they were 
doing, and placed them within a dynamic movement.  State legislator and 
veteran SNCC activist Julian Bond held a press conference in support of workers 
at Nabisco, pointing to unequal treatment at the plant.  In response to this 
publicity, Nabisco brought in their top negotiators from corporate headquarters to 
address the issue.  They met with Andrew Young in his role as director of the 
Atlanta’s Community Relations Commission.  Young maintained a neutral 
position in mediating the dispute.112   
After three weeks of demonstrations, the strikers returned to work with 
some of their grievances addressed.    Among the concessions, Fred White was 
rehired and the strikers’ jobs were reinstated; Nabisco agreed to make 
improvements to hiring and promotion practices; and management pledged to 
enforce rules against discriminatory practices by supervisors.  Some of the 
demands the company refused were improved medical benefits, equal pay for 
women, and the reinstatement of another unfairly dismissed employee Joe 
Ponder.113  While the victory was not as clear as the Sears battle, the workers felt 
that some tangible progress was made.114   
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Following the strike, however, participants, particularly whites, met hostility 
from their white co-workers.  They endured threats, name calling, and assaults.  
The environment grew so tense that Nan Grogan Orrock purchased a gun for 
protection.  A pamphlet published by organizers following the strike stated that 
“Nabisco knows as long as we are busy hating each other, fearing each other 
and attacking each other, then Nabisco comes out on top because we’ll be too 
divided to defend ourselves and win a decent contract.”115  The aggression 
eventually subsided, and after many more years of struggle black and white 
workers gradually began to work together within the union. 
On August 18, 1972, over 700 hourly employees at the Mead Corporation, 
the vast majority of whom were black, walked out and began a seven-week 
protest.  This strike is largely held as the most significant of the year.   
Headquartered in Dayton, Ohio, Mead’s main Atlanta site was located on West 
Marietta Street, near downtown Atlanta.  In 1972 there were approximately 1,200 
personnel. Their principal business was the assembly and sale of packaging 
materials and products, such as cardboard Coca Cola and Budweiser containers. 
The site housed branch administrative offices, a manufacturing plant, and a 
warehouse facility.116  The site had been unionized since 1959.117   
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Many of the white workers hailed from rural areas and were not 
accustomed to working around black people.  The result was a charged and 
often oppressive atmosphere.  Adding to tensions in the workplace, the plant was 
riddled with safety hazards, with blacks concentrated in the most dangerous 
areas.  One story that depicts working conditions was told to Gary Washington, 
not long after he started in 1970: 
The year before I came to work at Mead, there was an area that dealt with 
inks, and there was a vat that had acid in it, ‘cause there was this solvent 
type ink…  and they didn’t hire any blacks in this area…Two white guys 
who worked in this area, they slipped and fell into the vat; and when they 
came back up, all you saw were their skeletons… Those were the kinds of 
stories that I heard when I started working there.  And after that they hired 
about five blacks and put them in that area. 
 
This lore sent a chilling message to the new hire about the overall atmosphere at 
the plant, and illustrates the sense of injustice felt by many of the black workers. 
      A number of events occurred in the months leading up to the strike that 
precipitated the decision to take action.   A January 1972 edition of The Red 
Worker, The Political Newspaper of the Georgia Communist League (M-L), which 
was distributed at factory gates throughout the city, announced that Mead 
employee Melvin Crawford had just been sentenced to fourteen years in prison 
for shooting a floor superintendent.118 The article claimed that the Mead workers 
sympathized with Crawford, and quoted an employee who said, “People don’t 
just shoot people for no reason.  They must have been messing with him too 
much.  If bosses don’t want to get shot they’ve got to learn not to mess with their 
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workers.”  While the authors did not condone individual acts of violence, 
Crawford’s actions were labeled “revolutionary.” They claimed that the shooting 
was “an act of political struggle against the robbery and oppression that all 
workers experience under capitalism,” and touted Crawford as a “hero to all 
workers.”   
The Red Worker sought to use the circumstances surrounding this event  
to influence readers to join the party-building effort, intensify working class 
struggle, and overthrow the capitalist class.119  Most likely Crawford, like the 
majority of Mead workers, did not subscribe to a radical political ideology.  He 
had filed “grievance after grievance” against his supervisor and his frustration 
erupted in violence.  When he was being arrested, Crawford said, “I’m not sorry 
for what I’ve done.  Even if I have to go to jail, this will help keep the bosses off 
the backs of other workers.”120  While his situation was an extreme case, other 
workers had also reached the end of their rope in working through established 
channels and methods for resolving conflict. 
 Around the city, workers were standing up to management and insisting 
that they would no longer accept unjust treatment.  In recent months and weeks, 
unhappy Mead employees had observed their fellow Atlanta workers at the 
Fulton Cotton Mill, Holy Family Hospital, Citizens Trust Bank, Church’s Fried 
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Chicken, Regency Hyatt House hotel, Sears, Nabisco, and other companies take 
to the streets in protest.  This labor unrest set the stage for the Mead strike.  All 
of these strikes shared similar grievances – unfair pay, unsafe working 
conditions, discriminatory practices, problems with supervision, lack of benefits, 
and more.  They each employed comparable tactics, and received the support of 
civil rights groups, other sympathetic organizations, and a large section of the 
black community.  
The workers at Mead witnessed these actions while continuing to face 
unbearable treatment in their own place of employment.  October League 
members, who had been working in the plant since January, observed growing 
discontent and protest activities among their coworkers.121 At least four black 
workers were unfairly fired within a matter of weeks.  As the sweltering summer 
persisted, several black women in the plant fainted from heat exhaustion during 
forced overtime shifts.  In a memo dated June 30, 1972, plant manager, Jim 
Pasquarette responded to a grievance filed concerning the cooling and 
ventilation.  He described some recent and planned improvements, and wrote 
that “We are gradually coming to a better understanding of our mutual problems 
and have made real progress toward resolving them.”122  By that point, token 
gestures and polite promises of gradual progress could not assuage the workers’ 
                                                
121 Jerry Harris personal files provided to author by Kerry Taylor [hereafter cited 
as JH files]. “Building the Solidarity Committee at Mead,”  Spark, November 1972. pp. 9.     
 
122 JNP, Mead Corporation file, correspondence, “Second Step Answer to 
Grievance 72-2-30.” June 30, 1972. 
 
62 
discontent. They were approaching a boiling point.  These events served as the 
impetus for workers to finally take action at Mead.  
The disgruntled employees initially attempted to work through the legal 
union channels to address their grievances.123  A collective bargaining 
agreement with the Atlanta Printing Specialties and Paper Products Union Local 
527 bound employees until November 1973.124  Initially, workers aspired to 
develop a relationship with the union, and guide union leaders in a more inclusive 
representation of all of their members.125   At the outset, Local 527 attempted to 
mitigate the upheaval and urged them to negotiate; however, former interactions 
led workers to believe that they “needed something extreme to really get the 
attention of the company.”126  They recalled that “past experiences with the union 
leadership showed them to be unreliable in handling… grievances, especially 
those of the Black employees,”127   Angry workers quickly found that the union 
had no intention of cooperating and came to believe that the leadership was 
collaborating with company management.128 
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To harness this increased sentiment, October League members “set about 
organizing the spontaneous anger and will to act into a conscious, planned 
struggle.”129  As former OL member John Fletcher recalled, “We really instigated 
that strike, our people.  We had some black cadre in there… who really had a lot 
of respect.”130  They called the first strategy meeting, which was attended by 
twenty-five Mead employees.131  They met at a place called the Mass House 
near the Fulton County Stadium.132  In this meeting, held on August 6, 1972,133 
attendees formed a steering committee and began planning a wildcat strike.134  
Blacks comprised the majority of the Caucus, which had just a few white 
members.  The organizing committee included the most militant of the workers, 
only a few of whom were members of the October League.   They immediately 
began organizing and mobilizing workers in the plant. 135  As OL literature 
reported,   
For three weeks we organized the plant.  The committee met almost daily.  
We assigned people to organize areas of the plant which hadn’t been 
represented.  We developed a list of 30 demands, circulated them, started 
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mass discussions.  At a mass meeting they were debated, developed, 
increased to near 50.  At this mass meeting of over 200 Mead workers, 
the demands were formalized in to the Mead Workers’ Manifesto, we 
officially became the Mead Caucus of Rank and File Workers, and we 
delivered an ultimatum to the company.136 
 
 
On August 16, the Mead Caucus of Rank and File Workers submitted the “Mead 
Workers Manifesto” to management.  Hosea Williams presented the document to 
Mead President R. N. O’Hara in a meeting.  The cover memo stated that the 
workers’ intentions focused on “ending present racial and unAmerican-like hiring 
and promotional practices toward minorities.”137 
The “Mead Worker’s Manifesto” proposed remedies to workers’ ongoing 
grievances against the company in the form of forty-two numerated and eight 
additional demands.  Opposition to blatant discrimination was the Manifesto’s 
unifying theme.  Special emphasis was placed on equal treatment of blacks, 
particularly black women; however, the Mead Caucus insisted that its interests 
aligned with white workers as well.   They wished to make it: 
unequivocally clear that this is not a fight between Black employees 
and White employees of Mead Corporation, but this is a labor 
dispute, a confrontation between the hourly employees of Mead 
Corporation and management of Mead Corporation.138   
 
Some of demands, however, clearly called for preferential policies toward black 
workers to overcome discriminatory practices. 
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Several demands addressed health and safety concerns.  The workers 
urged Mead to adhere to the Federal Government is Environmental and 
Ecological Services guidelines.  They asked for improved ventilation and 
temperature controls as well as appropriate protective gear and an on-site 
Registered Nurse. Additionally, the employees expected that the company 
provide full health and life insurance coverage. 
Many of the demands addressed hiring, training, promotion, and job 
stability.  The Manifesto demanded that Mead remedy past discrimination in 
management, supervisory, clerical, and skilled positions by giving preference to 
black applicants.  The strikers complained that hourly employees did not have 
adequate training or development opportunities, and therefore were not given 
equal consideration for promotions.  They charged that the company was not 
making use of the workers’ potential, and insisted that policies be enacted to 
facilitate career growth.  Immediate fifty-cent raises and ongoing quarterly 
adjustments were demanded for all hourly employees.  Job protection in cases of 
injury, bereavement, and arrest was demanded as well.   
Another category of demand focused upon increased worker sovereignty 
and autonomy.  Workers wanted elected grievance and safety committees.  They 
wanted the authority to vote on policies, benefits, job descriptions, and the 
continued employment of supervisory staff. The Manifesto also contained a 
provision that the company must enter into a covenant with the Metro Atlanta 
Dekalb SCLC, requiring ongoing review. 
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In addition to policy changes, the Mead Caucus of Rank and File Workers 
included pleas to rectify specific cases of discrimination.  They asked that four 
employees receive back pay for time away from work because of harassment.  
They also requested jobs be reinstated with back pay for the “three brothers in 
plant 2” and an employee named Monroe Walker, who they felt were fired due to 
racism. Other miscellaneous demands included recognition of the Martin Luther 
King, Jr. holiday, the right to receive emergency phone calls, requests for 
company personnel information, and various types of contributions to the black 
community at large. 139 
Management’s response to the Manifesto was firm.  On the following day, 
a letter was distributed to the employees acknowledging receipt of the demands, 
and declaring that the company would not bargain with the group.  Instead, Mead 
management declared that they would be meeting with the very union that 
refused to represent the workers’ complaints in the first place.140 In a letter from 
Mead President Robert M. O’Hara to Williams on August 17, 1972, he stated: 
While we believe that our efforts through our managers, as well as through 
union and government channels, provide ample evidence that we are 
conscientiously pursuing those goals that would make our facilities a most 
desirable place to work, we are also realistic enough to recognize that we 
are either not communicating our own beliefs and efforts effectively, or 
perhaps are not hearing clearly the concerns and wishes of our 
employees. 
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He went on to say, “We intend to resolve our real problems with our employees, 
their legally elected labor officials and government agencies.”141  Another letter 
issued later that day promised action, rather than just sentiment.142 While O’Hara 
“pledge[d] to all employees that there shall be no discrimination against male or 
female black or white,” the measures the company took next made it clear that 
they would not be moved by the workers’ actions.143 According to the legal 
complaint filed by Mead Corporation against the striking workers, all of the 
Manifesto’s demands fell under the authority of the collective bargaining 
agreement with Local 527.  This agreement specifically stated that, “there shall 
be no strikes, picketing, walkouts, slowdowns, or other interferences with plant 
operations, at any time by reason of any dispute or disagreement between the 
parties.”144  The company claimed it could not legally recognize any 
representative group other than the union.145   
Upon the Mead Corporation’s refusal to discuss the proposed demands 
with the Caucus, seventy-five percent of the workers joined strike efforts.146  The 
picket lines closely resembled those of the civil rights movement, still fresh in the 
memory of most.  People stood in lines and marched, carrying white posters 
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scrawled with statements such as “United We Stand Divided We Fall.”  
Renditions of “freedom songs” such as “We Shall Overcome” and labor songs 
such as “Which Side Are You On?” could be heard at the gates.  The chants had 
been updated with the more contemporary lingo of the black power movement.  
“Soul Power!” leader Sherman Miller shouted. “Workers’ Power!” was the crowd’s 
response.147  While the situation they were facing was serious, at times the 
atmosphere could be described as festive.  They danced to the Staples Singers’ 
hit “Respect Yourself” and enjoyed the camaraderie of their fellow workers and 
their families.   
“We must also take our struggle to others in the Atlanta community – 
especially to our fellow workers in other plants – and encourage them to join us 
on the picket line and support our struggle,”148 a flyer distributed by the October 
League stated.  Workers recognized the need for support beyond Mead’s gates 
and set to work earning the community’s empathy and respect.  For the most 
part, the workers received great support from other local blacks.  Gary 
Washington recalled that “We tried to talk to workers at other businesses that 
were in the vicinity of the Mead Corporation to let them know what we were all 
about…we talked to people in the community; we talked to students; because we 
felt we needed a very broad coalition…”  In order to build popular support, 
workers employed grassroots organizing methods: 
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We had what we called mass meetings, and in these mass meetings 
students and people from other companies, they would come find out what 
was going on.  We would set up a phone tree with these people, and call 
them, get them to bring friends… to really build a movement that was 
wider and greater than just the workers that worked at Mead, ‘cause this 
was a struggle of all the people….  We wanted the community to be 
educated… and the reason we wanted the community to be educated was 
because we knew we were building to a point where we were going to 
have mass marches, and we really needed their participation...  If you’re 
going to have a mass march, you’ve got to have the community; and 
students and universities are a part of the community…. It was important 
to set up committees to talk to them, to go into the community… so that 
when we had these marches they would join us.  And they did.  And that 
kind of strategy worked.  It really paid off. 
 
In general, black community members welcomed information and pledged 
support.   Enough food and relief money was donated to sustain the workers 
during their unpaid strike.  Supporters stood outside of gates at companies 
throughout the city, collecting as much as fifty dollars a day.149  One rally secured 
six hundred dollars, four hundred of which was given by individual generous 
donors, probably local business people.150   Additionally, striking workers from 
Sears and Nabisco came out to help maintain the picket lines and show their 
support.151 
Without union authorization, participation in organized activity against the 
company constituted an illegal, or “wildcat,” strike.  In response, the Mead 
Corporation brought suit against striking employees for their actions.  Allegations 
against the workers included blocking the entrance, business interference, 
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coercion, intimidating behavior, and even violence.152 As a result of the 
disruption, Mead was temporarily forced to shut down operations.  The company 
claimed a financial loss of more than $200,000, and alleged that further 
interference with their business would result in loss of customers as well as 
ongoing, immeasurable, and possibly irrevocable damage.153 
Fulton County Superior Court Judge Jack Etheridge promptly placated 
Mead management by granting a restraining order against the strikers, effective 
Saturday, August 19, 1972.  By order of the decree, protestors were prohibited 
from interfering with entrance and exit through the gate, using any inappropriate 
language on the premises, initiating any kind of physical contact with employees 
or business associates of Mead, making intimidating phone calls, assembling in 
large groups on or near company property, influencing others to organize against 
the company, or any interference with business practices.154 Management issued 
a letter the following Monday to notify all employees of this measure, as well as 
make them aware that Atlanta police officers would be stationed at each 
entrance.155 
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The company asked all three shifts to return to work at 7:00 am on 
Monday, August 21.  The striking workers alleged that the reason management 
selected a morning start, rather than an evening, was because most white 
employees were assigned to the day shift.  Mead wanted to assure that 
operations would resume as scheduled; however, a flyer distributed by the 
striking workers claimed that only twenty percent of the workers “scabbed.”156  
While the Atlanta Constitution reported that the demonstrators blocked the 
entrance to the gates, physically intimidating people from crossing the line,157 the 
workers asserted that this was a lie that management fed to the media.  They 
even claimed that a worker crossing the line hit a female picketer.   
Despite the company’s uncooperative attitude, the strikers were confident 
that they would be victorious.  “We as workers are ready to be jailed or driven 
from this earth,” said participant Willie Frank Lane, “but we are going to win our 
rights in this strike.”158  In his usual style, Hosea Williams proclaimed, “We will 
stay out till Mead has to sell watermelons to pay the light bill.”  In order to solicit 
further support, they called a mass meeting for the workers and the surrounding 
community on Tuesday, August 22 at 8:00 P.M at Wheat Street Baptist Church’s 
Educational building.159  These mass meetings, attended by 50 to 300 workers, 
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were held several times a week throughout the strike to disseminate information 
and sustain the workers’ enthusiasm.160 
After over a week of demonstrations with no cooperation from the 
company, Fulton County Judge Claude Shaw ruled that only two picketers could 
demonstrate outside of Mead’s gates at a time.  The strikers, however, were not 
discouraged.161  Williams petitioned for the U.S. district court to take over 
jurisdiction in the lawsuit against the workers.162  He felt that the order was 
unconstitutional and stated that, “if necessary, I will go to jail.  We will continue to 
picket.”163  He argued that the charge that the strike violated the existing union 
contract made the suit a federal issue.  Mead general manager Pat Benatar 
claimed that many workers wanted to return to work, but were afraid of crossing 
the picket line.  The court ruled in the company’s favor and stated that the 
hearing would remain under the state’s jurisdiction.  An attorney for the Mead 
strikers worried that, “I’ve never known a state court to rule against the company 
in a labor dispute.”164   
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A reporter from The Atlanta Voice attempted to interview Mead 
management regarding the strike that afternoon.  He spoke to a member of 
management named Mr. Zammataro who claimed that he was not authorized to 
give official statements to the press.  Through their conversation, the reporter 
was able to elicit some of the manager’s personal views about the worker’s 
actions.  Zammataro stated that he believed social change was occurring too 
fast, that he was leery of efforts to educate the masses, and feared too many 
people attempting to gain wealth at once was detrimental to society.  The 
company official said: 
Maybe I might be old fashion but I just don’t think anything can be solved 
in this way.  I grew up on the wrong side of the tracks…it might have been 
harder at that time for a Black person but the Black people can make it if 
they work, hard.  I had some Black classmates from the ghetto in school 
with me.  Sure they had to work harder than others but they made it.165 
 
Though he did not make an official company statement about the strike, his 
beliefs were more revealing than he was likely aware.  The black readers of The 
Atlanta Voice clearly would have recognized this type of attitude as the 
underlying cause for the discriminatory treatment in the workplace.  In spite of 
this, the article did not serve as an endorsement by The Voice.  The reporter was 
careful to point out that a white male picketer threatened his life if he reported 
anything negative about the strike.166 
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 On August 31, management created a “new mechanism” to address 
employee concerns, which they called the “President’s Atlanta Employee 
Council.”  This committee consisted of group of company-appointed employees, 
none of whom were involved in the strike. They were to serve as liaisons 
between hourly employees and management.  Management ran an ad in the  
Atlanta Daily World, the city’s conservative Black newspaper, which read: 
Mead wants to solve the problem and the company is moving in the right 
direction… its employees will solve it.  Communication lines have been 
opened.  Management and labor are talking.  Don’t lose your seniority 
while you are being heard.   Earn a living and be heard.167 
 
The problem with this appeal was that it completely disregarded all of the strikers’ 
demands.  The workers had not put their jobs on the line for such a meager 
response.  They were not going to budge until their demands were met.   
During the course of the strike, demonstrators clashed with the Atlanta 
Police Department several times. The film Wildcat at Mead shows picketers 
being pushed and beaten with nightsticks and dragged into paddy wagons.168  
Becky Hamilton reported in an article in the The Great Speckled Bird: 
People all over the country are reacting with outrage to the brutal beatings 
broadcast over NBC national news – from the city ‘too busy to hate.’  
Mead was getting terrible publicity.  Support was building for the strike.  
And no one was working! (which was bad for Atlanta’s image as a 
southern city where industry comes for cheap, apathetic, unorganized 
labor). 169 
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Towards the end, tensions worsened. Seventy-five Mead strikers were arrested 
for criminal trespass170 and held on an exorbitant $1,000 bail each.  Several 
members of the black business community answered Williams’s call to cover the 
cost of bailing the organizers out of jail.  Mortuary owner Herachel Thornton, 
storeowner Charles Allen, and pastor Dr. Joseph Lowery were among those who 
bonded out the strikers.171  A front-page article in The Atlanta Voice noted that 
“Aides close to Williams claimed that the mass arrests and the brutality on the 
part of the police, along with other actions, is an effort by the white power 
structure to stop Williams’ drive to organize poor people.” 172 
The Atlanta Police Department and the Fulton County District Attorney’s 
office were on special alert because of the communist involvement in the strike.  
The Atlanta Constitution reported that both organizations were investigating thhe 
connection between Williams and the October League (M-L).  They were aware 
that several key October League leaders were involved in the demonstrations 
and they also believed the organization was funding the strikers.  Mead GM 
Benetar explained that he knew that six to eight of the striking employees were 
OL members, and that they passed out copies of The Red Worker at the gate.173  
They believed that activists had infiltrated companies throughout the city, and 
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were suspected culprits in recent bomb threats.   In addition to Mead, he believed 
that that OL members were organizing at General Motors and Atlantic Steel. H.G. 
Bailey of the Fulton County District Attorney’s office claimed that, “They are a 
well-educated and well-financed militant group that has just filtered into Atlanta 
over the past year… We’ve been equaling them to the Weathermen version of 
the new Communist Party.”  He went on to explain that they did not carry cards 
and tended to deny their membership. They preferred not to call attention to 
themselves. Atlanta Police Lieutenant W.W. Holley corroborated Bailey’s report, 
also confirming that his investigation showed evidence of links between the 
SCLC and the OL.174   
In an effort to “red bait” the organization, The Atlanta Constitution charged 
that OL members were intermingling with the SCLC.  While Rev. Williams 
admitted that he was aware of the organization and knew that members were 
participating, he insisted that they did not help organize or finance the strike.  He 
claimed, “Not too long ago, somebody offered $1,000 in contributions from an 
anonymous source, but I told them that I had to know where any money came 
from that I touch.  I suspect it was the League’s money.”175  Williams went on to 
state: 
About the only thing that we ever had to do with these folks was the Mead 
deal… They almost ruined it by trying to take over the show 
themselves…“They never do any work.  All they do is sit around and 
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philosophize.  I don’t think these folks could raise 10 people this afternoon 
if their lives depended on it.”176   
 
Williams was concerned that media focus on the communist involvement in the 
strike was going to undermine his leadership and call attention away from the 
workers’ demands. 177   Gary Washington recalled that, “the agenda of groups 
like the October League [did not] supersede the agenda of the people that [were} 
there…  The black workers had determined they were going on strike.”  A 
newsletter called Take Off: Voice of the Mead Workers, produced by the workers 
themselves said of the October League, “[they] were hired by Mead, that’s 
Mead’s problem.  The October League is no problem to the people.”178 
In examining the surviving sources, it is clear that Williams and the 
October League leaders were not strategic allies.  OL literature and commentary 
on the “Wildcat at Mead” film criticize William’s leadership style and philosophy.  
They both wanted a victory for the workers, but that is where their similarities 
ended.  In a document entitled “October League Reply to the Atlanta 
Constitution,” the group attempted to set the record straight concerning their 
relationship with the SCLC: 
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Ideological differences do exist between the October League and the 
S.C.L.C.  on the question of achieving the final solution to the problems of 
the masses of poor and oppressed of all nationalities.  However, a working 
relationship has been built on the basis of common support for the Mead 
workers’ struggle179 
 
Additionally, William’s charismatic leadership style conflicted with the October 
League’s philosophy of a democratic movement headed by the workers 
themselves.    
 In response to the media’s efforts to undermine the workers’ claims, the 
OL vehemently denied the charges made by the newspaper that “outside 
agitators” coerced the workers into action.  They proclaimed that “to charge as 
they have, that the October League is to blame for the labor unrest in Atlanta is a 
lie…The truth is that Mead and the companies like them are to blame for the 
unrest.”  The document then listed the complaints of racism, exploitation, and 
unfair treatment that influenced the workers’ decision to take action.  They also 
pointed out the violence used against the workers during their peaceful 
demonstrations.  They summed up their argument by stating that they openly 
declare their support of socialism and disdain for “greedy” capitalism.180   
The negative media attention required a response from Michael Klonsky,  
the October League national chairman,.   He traveled to Atlanta from California to 
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address the local news media at a televised press conference, where he read a 
longer statement, which included the following: 
Instead of accepting the workers’ demands and ending these conditions, 
Mead has directed an all-out campaign of racism and anti-communism in 
the press, designed to make the October League their scapegoat.  Their 
cries of ‘outside agitators’ and a ‘communist-inspired’ strike have served 
only to expose their vicious character and their commitment to anti-worker 
policies within their factory.  The charges they have that the October 
League is to blame for the labor unrest in Atlanta is a lie, which all of the 
Mead workers are able to see through.  The truth is that Mead and 
companies like them are to blame for the unrest, unrest that will never 
cease until the real causes are changed.  It’s not the October League 
which has been forcing workers to work in air that has been so filthy and 
polluted with dust that several women have passed out, only to be 
immediately sent back on line when they were revived.  This crime has 
been done by Mead Corporation.  It is not the October League which has 
practiced racial discrimination in their policies of hiring and promotions, 
reserving all or most of the better paying jobs, the skilled jobs, for the 
white workers, while the blacks are kept in the dirtiest and lowest paying 
jobs….  It was Mead, not the October League, who directed the Atlanta 
Police Department, to attack the Mead workers on September 21st, jailing 
more than a hundred workers, and brutally clubbing the arrested workers 
to the ground.  To the charges of fighting to put an end to these conditions 
and to this oppressive system, we the October League plead guilty.181 
 
Klonsky asserted Mead and its collaborators had devised the red baiting 
campaign to counter the challenge the strike’s allegations made to the 
company’s legitimacy.  Their intention was to discredit participants’ grievances.  
Klonsky used this opportunity to exploit media access he otherwise would not 
have had and used it as a platform to promote the October League. 
 On October 3, the company proposed a settlement, addressed to Rev. 
Andrew. J. Young in his capacity as chairman of the Community Relations 
Commission.  Towards the end of the strike, Young stepped in as a mediator as 
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he had in previous strikes.  The settlement called for an immediate halt to all 
protest activity, and promised in return adherence to a list of concessions.  It 
outlined plans for significantly improved relationship structures between 
management, supervisory personnel, and hourly workers.   
Mead would establish a human relations council to hear grievances, a new 
protocol for handling disputes, and a mechanism – the President’s Atlanta 
Employee Council - for workers to communicate with senior executives to call 
attention to issues before they escalated to the level the “wildcat” strike had. 
Provisions for improved safety conditions were also included.  The company 
approved a budget of $20,000 to install equipment that would reduce the amount 
of air-born dust, and announced that they would install additional safety 
equipment in the ink vat area as well as provide employees assigned to that area 
rubber boots to prevent slipping. Management claimed they would investigate all 
accusations of discrimination and enforce federal law protecting against 
discrimination based on “race, sex, age or national origin,”  and specifically 
banned use of the racial slurs Nigger, Whitey, Honky, Cracker, Spade, and Boy.  
It refused back pay for time missed during the strike, but allowed for non-interest 
bearing loans so that employees could catch up on their bills. Additionally, it 
contained mechanisms for ongoing auditing and progress reports.182    In a 
document titled, “Statement of Company Position,” management admitted that 
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that meetings with various representatives and workers had, “brought to light 
matters of legitimate concern to all employees.”  However, it also asserted that 
“the company has a right by law to operate its business, those individuals who go 
outside the law [will] be held accountable for their actions, and people who 
withhold their labor cannot be paid for time not worked.”183  Besides those 
individuals specifically banned, the majority of the strikers returned to work on 
October 8.184 
 At a press conference, Williams declared that “We did not gain everything 
sought, but we gained a whole lot more than we had when we began.”  He 
dismissed questions about who was responsible for reaching an agreement as 
unimportant.  In his typical style, Williams closed with the comment that, “The rich 
live well but poor people catch hell.”  He reminded the crowd that the workers 
retained the right to continue to push for the demands listed in their Manifesto.  
He also did not shy away from saying that he was prepared to launch a nation-
wide work stoppage at all Mead locations should they not live up to their 
promises.185   
Gary Washington confirmed that overall conditions improved significantly 
after the strike. While instances of racism and problems with supervision 
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persisted, incidents were isolated rather than pervasive.  Management 
understood that the workers were willing to take action if necessary.  Even more 
importantly, according to Washington, the strike exposed workers to the fact that 
the company could join forces with the government and media to protect their 
own elite interests, but the workers could also achieve power by banding 
together.  “People really learned a lesson that they never forgot; and then they 
went back in with their heads up, so they had respect.”186  
 The Mead Packaging Plant wildcat strike resulted in a moderate victory for 
the workers in that some, but not all, of their grievances were resolved.  More 
importantly, they learned that they had the power to stand up to inequitable 
treatment in the workplace, just as those in the civil rights movement had fought 
against unjust laws and treatment in the previous decade.   
An unsigned editorial in The Atlanta Voice took note of the year’s strike 
trend.  “Atlantans seem to have been rather shaken up in recent months over 
what they feel is a continuing pattern of protest around this growing city, which 
disturb their peace and plans from day to day.”  The editorial goes on to explain 
that some in the community were paranoid that “every business, every store will 
get the pickets sooner or later.”   In response to this, it reminds readers of the 
city’s recent past, of the fact that black moderates initially opposed lunch counter 
sit-ins, just as they were leery of the labor unrest.  “Common sense should tell us 
that it would be impossible, in this short span of years that has followed to wipe 
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out the prejudice, to wipe out the unfairness, and the problems to create a city 
that has no racism from the spirit of ex slavers and ex slaves.”  The editorial then 
proposes that critics of the strike “should look around and see what other means 
have won changes in the city.”187  
Workers in Atlanta in 1972 recognized the power of protest. They sought 
to be treated fairly, and made significant strides against the widespread practice 
of overt discrimination.  Institutional and subtler forms of racism, however, are 
something they continue to struggle against to this day.  The legacies of their 
battle could be seen in the Atlanta activist community for years to come; and 
some supporters have remained active in their communities over thirty years 
later. 
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Chapter 3 
Beginning a New Era 
 
The labor unrest that swept in Atlanta in 1972 ignited hope for activists 
interested in improving the potential as well as the plight of the working class.   
Victories at Holy Family, Sears, Nabisco, Mead and other companies raised 
expectations for struggle in workplaces throughout the city.  Both civil rights 
leaders and leftist organizers attempted to harness this momentum for additional 
gain.   Invigorated by workers’ willingness to take action against their employers, 
October League members and other like-minded leftists sought to advance their 
anti-imperialist agenda.  Civil Rights activists enjoyed increased community 
support, even across racial lines, as moderate Atlantans worried about more 
popular upheaval and wearied of the political stranglehold of the business elite.  
With a racially charged mayoral campaign and the potential impending shift in 
political power from white to black, most Atlantans were paying close attention to 
local events.  The working class protests continued in the following months, but 
as Atlanta’s political landscape evolved, confrontational tactics largely gave way 
to more moderate approaches and political compromise.  The city’s tumultuous 
transition period continued into 1973, but by the end of that year 1960s style 
activism began to decrease.   
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After the majority of the strikers returned to work at Mead, the forty fired 
workers remained out of a job for more than four months.  In the meantime, those 
who did return began to realize some of the concessions won in the strike.  
Management met one of the Manifesto’s demands by establishing a committee, 
the Presidents Council Against Discrimination, to facilitate communication with 
black workers, review the implementation of promised improvements, and 
provide a platform for airing grievances.   The company also agreed to recognize 
the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday for the first time in January 1973, by allowing 
workers to enjoy the day off as long as they submitted a request a week in 
advance.   In February, Mead employees and supporters formed the Committee 
to Support the Mead Workers in an effort to increase community backing of the 
forty who had not yet been rehired.  This committee passed out flyers, recruited 
volunteers, and raised funds to ease the financial burden.  Worker-activists in the 
plant continued to show support by staging work slow downs, circulating 
petitions, and holding fundraisers.188   
After extended arbitration in Fulton County courts, the Board of Arbitrators 
convened at the local Federal Mediation and Conciliation Offices on February 6, 
1973, and placed votes for or against reinstatement for each defendant in the 
lawsuit against key strike participants.189  Among the charges of misconduct 
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under consideration by the board were “encouraging others not to cross the 
picket line during the strike or giving the clenched fist salute, which the Mead 
plant manager described as ‘just not acceptable in our society.’”190  In a letter 
addressed to Leo Benatar, president of Mead Packaging, and Ralph Meers, 
president of Atlanta Printing Specialists Union, Local 527, arbitrator Robert T. 
Aimes identified those considered strike instigators – Wayne Dranznin, Sherman 
Miller, Betty Bryant, Johnnie Berry, James and Suzanne Branson, Kay Nelson, 
and Joseph Goodman - by denying their petition for reinstatement.191  A total of 
thirty-two of the forty workers fired during the Mead strike were finally reinstated 
in March.192    
After the strike, the Mead Caucus of Rank and File Workers operated  
legitimately as a representative group within the union, in that leadership and 
management agreed to recognize the organization in meetings and negotiations.  
The black caucus members began to meet regularly with white workers, some of 
whom were starting to recognize that management used racism to divide them 
and thwart the power of the workers and progress of the union.193  According to 
Gary Washington:  
The white workers didn’t understand what was going on, and they went in 
to support the company, and later learned from that, the company didn’t 
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have their best interests at heart.  So it was a learning ground for the white 
workers that scabbed and went to work.. They learned what the company 
was all about. 
 
“At a recent union meeting,” a February article in The Call noted, “the growing 
unity was expressed as both black and white workers spoke of the need for a 
united struggle.”194   Some of the hostility subsided and dialogue broke down 
longstanding barriers.  Additionally, blacks started to gain leadership roles within 
the union.  For example, Gary Washington remembered white co-workers 
encouraging him to run for shop steward after recognizing his contributions 
during the strike.   In 1981, lessons from the 1972 strike were remembered and 
put into practice when black and white employees joined the picket lines against 
Mead together.195 
Mead strategically confronted this growing sense of power and unity 
among their employees, but their efforts were countered by a raised awareness 
within the rank and file.  Workers recognized that management attempted to 
intimidate them through layoffs, a tactic often used to create an atmosphere of 
insecurity.  To offset such suspicion, the corporate office announced that they 
were committed to “social responsibility,” a new term being used among the 
business community in response to the era’s prevalent progressive activism: 
Critics of American capitalism contend that corporate management is 
aligned with its stockholders against the interests of the working man.  In 
this climate, which in a broader sense is anti-establishment in many forms, 
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American business has witnessed the growth of proxy fights at annual 
share holder meetings in the interest of one cause or another.196   
 
Because Mead understood that its standing on Wall Street might be affected by 
the negative image caused by worker unrest, management formed a Corporate 
Responsibility Committee.  Former Atlanta mayor and member of Mead’s board 
of directors Ivan Allen Jr. participated in this organization, whose stated purpose 
was to research reasons for discontent and open lines of communication.  Their 
findings were released in the 1972 annual report.  Concerning the wildcat strike, 
the company admitted, “though illegal, it did focus attention on some real 
problems: minority promotional opportunities, a dust condition, [and] blocked 
communications.”197  Additionally, a corporate officer, Paul Allemang, traveled 
from headquarters in Ohio to Atlanta in hopes of improving management’s image 
in the eyes of the workers – he sought to quell suspicion about further layoffs, 
congratulated employees on their safety record, and shook many hands.198  An 
article in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution’s business section on May 23, 1973, 
reported Mead management’s actions as part of what leftist activists considered 
primarily a public relations campaign.  “The workers at Mead,” asserted Mike 
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Raffauf in the The Great Speckled Bird, “[were] tightly organized to fight these 
tactics and politically aware enough to see through them.”199 
 Immediately following the strike at Mead, October League leadership 
began sharing lessons learned during Atlanta’s 1972 “wildcat” strikes.  In 
October, they launched a substantial newspaper called The Call, printed in its 
entirety in both English and Spanish (El Claròn).  In the introductory issue, the 
editors proclaimed: 
The task of party building, uniting the broad masses and preparing them 
for the struggle ahead, requires a newspaper through which the 
revolutionary organization can bring its views to the people.  It is with this 
in mind that we have begun to publish THE CALL.200   
 
Published out of Bell Gardens, California and distributed throughout the country, 
the newspaper reported on the workers’ and communist movements and gave 
significant coverage to the recent and ongoing unrest in Atlanta.  Both members 
and non-members served on a committee to write articles.  OL members and 
supporters sold issues outside of gates throughout the city. 
The November 1972 issue of the New Communist newsletter Spark 
contained a “General Report of the Mead Strike” and an article on “Building the 
Solidarity Committee at Mead,” which detailed early reflections on the preceding 
months’ events, including perceived successes, failures, and implications.  The 
articles were published to prepare “comrades” for an upcoming labor conference, 
where OL leaders hoped “the entire organization will get the benefit of the most 
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advanced experience we have had in any one particular locality; it will raise our 
understanding of our tasks in the shops and is bound to give the work 
everywhere a big push forward.”201  New Communist activists around the country 
considered the Mead “wildcat” strike a momentous accomplishment for the 
movement, and viewed it as an indication that their agenda would make great 
strides in the coming period. 
In December 1972, October League members who worked at Nabisco 
began publishing a newsletter called The Scoop.  The OL used this publication to 
introduce themselves to the employees: 
Maybe you heard about the October League during the Mead Strike when 
the newspapers started attacking us to try to break up the strike.  Or 
maybe you’ve heard about the Nabisco bosses and their buddies ranting 
and raving about us.  They say, “Communists want to break up the union, 
communists want to keep trouble stirred up, communists hate white 
people, communists bomb factories.”  All of these are bosses lies to try to 
scare people and divide the workers… 
 
The editors advocated solidarity between white and black workers and called for 
further organizing among plant workers to address unresolved grievances.  
Beyond concrete problems within the plant, The Scoop attempted to convince 
readers to view the capitalist system as the source of not only their problems at 
work, but also the culprit behind war, racism, crime, drugs, and other social ills.  
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The OL insisted that workers must organize against the ruling class and build a 
socialist society.202   
The January issue of The Scoop documented mixed reactions to the first 
issue and addressed some of the concerns raised.  They clarified their stance as 
pro-union and reasserted their position against racial polarization.   
The rich businessmen and factory owners are glad to see Black and white 
workers split apart and fighting each other.  They try to convince white 
workers that they have more in common with their bosses than they do 
with their black co-workers.  And they try to convince Black workers that 
white workers (instead of rich people) are their main enemy.  All this takes 
heat off the bosses, so they can make higher profits.203 
 
Having witnessed the stark rift between black and white workers at Nabisco, 
while also recognizing the black workers’ willingness to stand up against 
management, the October League leadership saw great potential for party 
building at the plant.  In an effort to do this, the OL endeavored to raise the 
workers’ consciousness by communicating through The Scoop.  
   With the “wildcat” strikes having captured the national spotlight among 
communist organizers, New Communist Movement leaders convened in Atlanta 
on Thanksgiving weekend in 1972.  The agenda of this conference, entitled 
“Communist Work in Factories,” was to prepare for labor actions in the near 
future.  Announced participants were October League members Lynn Wells and 
Sherman Miller, Black Workers Congress leader Don Williams, and veteran black 
labor activist Otis Hyde.  Don Williams gave a talk on how to organize within 
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factories, emphasized the importance of basing action on concrete conditions in 
each location, and suggested the need for development of rank and file 
organizations patterned on the model of Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement 
(DRUM), a group that had successfully organized black workers in Detroit in the 
late 1960s.204  Hyde focused on the black liberation movement and explained 
that while it was important for blacks and whites to unite in struggle, it was also 
crucial for blacks to remain at the forefront of their own fight for liberation.205  
Additional attendees included members of the Cambridge, Massachusetts based 
Boston Workers’ Congress, Baltimore’s Communist Workers’ League, New York-
based Red Flag League, Chicago’s Red Star League, People’s College in 
Nashville, Tennessee, Association of Communist Workers from Louisville, 
Kentucky, and activists from Chinatown in New York, Chicago’s ethnic 
communities, and North Carolina.206 The group was tasked with creating 
literature that could inform an action plan targeting US industry, particularly 
automakers.207   
During the time this meeting took place, a major union-sanctioned strike 
was underway at the General Motors plant in Norwood, Ohio.   As the national 
news media covered the strike, New Communist activists recognized the 
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potential impact their involvement could have. After twenty-five weeks on strike, 
some of the 4,000 GM workers were growing increasingly disillusioned with their 
union leadership.208  At the meeting in Atlanta, communist organizers set out to 
determine how to harness the growing militancy among GM employees and other 
US workers.  Workshop topics included, “Building Solidarity Committees and 
Rank and File Organizations,” “Question in the Plants,” “Agitation and 
Propaganda,” “Strike Strategy,” and “The Upcoming Struggle in the Auto 
Industry.”  The OL published reports on each workshop over the following 
months in The Call and produced a report that outlined their plans.  
At the conference, Sherman Miller explained some of the successes and 
failures the October League had experienced at Mead.  The group immediately 
recognized that one of the biggest weaknesses was failing to connect with white 
workers.  He stressed the importance of working across race lines and educating 
all workers about class struggle.  Miller also underscored the need to move 
beyond the “advanced worker” to organize among the broad masses.209  
Additionally, he advised that organizers should thoroughly research conditions in 
each plant, identify key issues with which workers strongly identified, and 
develop tailored campaigns based on actual grievances.  Another key point of 
advice was to form an organization at each plant, comprised of rank and file 
workers, with democratically elected leadership.  Within those organizations, 
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communist members could introduce political issues and work to expand the 
consciousness of the workers.  Lastly, Miller urged patience and stressed the 
need for a long-term vision.210   
Because of his role as chairman of the Mead Caucus of Rank and File 
workers and communist affiliation, Sherman Miller was among the few denied his 
job; so instead of returning to the factory, he became a spokesman for the 
October League.211  After the conference, Miller toured the country, touting the 
October League’s doctrine, giving lectures, and showing the documentary film, 
Wildcat at Mead.212  The fifty-minute film, produced by the October League 
immediately following the strike as a recruiting tool, is a black and white 
documentary account of actions that took place during the Mead wildcat strike.  
The film depicted how the participants constructed and conveyed their 
grievances, their protest methods, the communication style of their leaders, and 
the role the media played in the strike. The opening scene captures the lively 
energy of a general meeting, in which the participants chant loudly, clap, and 
sing.  Next, a female narrator gives an overview of what the film will be about 
against the backdrop of soul music and images of the plant.  Spoken over 
                                                
 
211 Ibid. 
 
212 An advertisement in the January 1973 issue of The Call announced lectures 
by Sherman Miller and film viewing of Strike at Mead in Los Angeles, Long Beach, and 
Berkeley, California over a week-long period in January, 1973.  An ad in the February 
issue of The Call referred to it as Wildcat at Mead and offered showings accompanied by 
speakers for fees of $100 for schools and $50 for Political Organizations.  An article in 
the March issue of The Call mentioned that proceeds for viewings of the film were 
“shown around the country and thousands of dollars were raised to help support the 
families of the fired workers.” 
95 
footage of the workers’ children, young black boys and girls with raised fists 
wearing handmade posters bearing the slogan “This is Your Fight Too,” the 
narrator explains:  
[I]t was the workers themselves that were the strength of the strike.  
Throughout the day to day struggles, they did the work, they took 
the risks, they bore the brunt of the oppression that came down on 
them.  Their spirit and unity is an example for all working and 
oppressed people in their struggle for dignity, human rights, and 
final control of their own destiny.  This film is one part of that great 
struggle. (“Wildcat” 1972) 
 
The film goes on to show strike participants in mule marches, rallies, and 
confrontations with police.  The filmmakers include interviews with individual 
workers and clips of OL members meeting with workers to provide them an 
opportunity to express why they thought a “wildcat” strike was necessary. 
Repeatedly, workers emphasized the fact that the union ignored their calls for 
help.  The film’s narrative leaves agency in the hands of the workers, something 
the OL stressed as crucial to maintaining the New Communist movement’s 
integrity.   
According to Sherman Miller’s observation at the end of Wildcat at Mead, 
many of the workers involved were exposed to ideas that allowed them to begin 
to shape the notion of “one struggle against the same oppressor.”  By working 
towards the personal goal of improving working conditions, formerly apolitical 
workers started to connect the strike with the Vietnam war and other global 
struggles.  “A lot of the people in this strike have come to realize what it means to 
fight for ‘power to the people.” It’s not a slogan anymore.  They’re beginning to 
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understand what it really means, what working class means,” expressed Miller.  
The narrator concludes Wildcat at Mead by stating: 
The struggle at Mead is not over.  The oppression and exploitation 
of the Afro-American people and all working people is being met 
with continued resistance.  The strike at Mead is an example of that 
resistance.  The great revolutionary leader, Lenin, has said that 
strikes are a school for war.  This school daily teaches the masses 
of people that their final emancipation can only be achieved through 
the revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist system.  The lessons 
learned at Mead are ammunition, ammunition for peoples’ struggles 
all around the country.  The actions of the Mead workers is a call, a 
call for their brothers and sisters to join in common struggles for 
liberation.213  
 
The October League viewed the Mead strike as an opportunity for party building, 
so they used the film to present information and ideas in such a way that it would 
persuade the audience to sympathize with their cause.  The film made the story 
of the strike duplicable and portable so that it could be used as a mobilizing tool.  
Through images and sound, it portrays the spirit of the strike and seeks to 
convey the October League’s larger agenda.  Sherman Miller was able to reach a 
wide audience of leftist activists around the country when he showed the film and 
lectured in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Baltimore, New York, and 
Boston.  Moreover, he raised significant funds in the process to support the 
workers’ continued struggle.214 
In addition to their connection to the national arena, Atlanta activists were 
also associated with what they considered an international communist 
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movement.  They looked towards peoples’ struggles in China and Cuba as 
models.  When a group of eleven progressive women from all over the country 
visited the Peoples’ Republic of China in November 1972, at least two women 
who were active in Atlanta’s strikes attended.  One Mead strike participant stated 
that she “wanted to find out how workers in China make decisions and run their 
own society.”  Nanny Washburn, who also traveled as part of the delegation, said 
that she went to “express solidarity with all my brothers and sisters over there.”215  
With more exposure to international issues, progressive activists 
increasingly urged workers to view their struggle as part of a global system of 
oppression.  Miller expressed that “workers now talk in terms of struggle against 
the ‘system’ and the ‘power structure’ rather than just a strike against Mead.  We 
have begun to show the connections between corporate power and how 
imperialism is a world front of monopoly.”216 The Atlanta Coordinating 
Committee, formed by local activists as an umbrella organization of leftist groups 
the previous May to reignite the city’s anti-war movement, urged unified struggle 
against imperialism.  Calling for participation at an anti-war rally on November 18, 
1972, the ACC proclaimed: 
the war in Vietnam is no accident, but an example of the inevitable 
aggression that imperialism relies on to secure and increase its control 
over countries for the purpose of making ever-increasing profits.  At the 
same time, these corporations – General Motors, Mead, Sears, Chase 
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Manhattan Bank, Gulf Oil, etc. – also exploit and oppress the people of the 
US.  We therefore stand in opposition to US imperialism and oppose the 
war, not simply as an isolated phenomenon, but as part and parcel of the 
system of imperialism.217 
 
In keeping with this focus, the organization soon changed its name to the Atlanta 
Anti-Imperialist Coalition.  In a demonstration held on Inauguration Day in 1973, 
various local activists and supporters rallied at the state capitol.  Nanny 
Washburn spoke about her recent trip to the Peoples’ Republic of China, death-
row inmate and former GM worker Henry Whitlock’s sister told the crowd about 
her brother’s unfair trial, and Gary Washington of the Mead Caucus of Rank and 
File Workers filled in for a member who could not be there.  A reporter for the 
The Great Speckled Bird noted that Washington’s “speech calling for unity 
among black and white workers in overcoming imperialism at home and abroad 
was impromptu but couldn’t have been better if it had been prepared.”  The 
article further explained that, “the overall message of the day was of workers, 
black and white, and all other laboring classes coming together to win the fight 
against imperialism in our daily lives and in the lives of our comrades in other 
countries.”218 
 Hosea Williams shared the ideal of opposing imperialism and the 
exploitative nature of capitalism.  Like the October League, he actually quoted 
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Mao Tse Tung in several articles in The Atlanta Voice.219  “Black Americans must 
understand that their major problem is not basically racial, it is economic; it is part 
of the overall world class struggle,” he explained. 220  However, Williams also 
understood the importance of practical tactics and tangible efforts, for the 
problems at hand were urgent, not just theoretical and abstract.  “Although 
capitalism is wrong – it is exploitive – we are caught in it.  Therefore we must 
exploit it for all the benefits poor people can possibly receive, until such time we 
can come up with an accept[able] alternative,” he urged.  With this mindset, 
Williams and his supporters continued doing what they did best – organizing, 
marching, confronting, and exposing oppression and exploitation.   
 After Mead, Williams’ Dekalb/Metro-Atlanta branch of the SCLC took a 
stand against South Fulton Hospital in East Point for discriminatory hiring and 
promotion practices, and turning away black patients.221  At a rally, he shouted, 
“when the poor white man wakes up – I know he’s asleep but if he ever wakes up 
– together we can turn this country around.”222 Next, his organization stood 
against the Atlanta Greyhound Bus Company for refusing to recognize the 
national Amalgamated Transit Union and hiring part time workers to avoid paying 
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benefits.223  By December, mobilization had intensified to the point where the 
Metro-Atlanta SCLC announced that it was founding a “Poor People’s Union.”  
Inspired by an organization called the Distributive Workers of America (DWA) 
that claimed a 30,000 member base in New York, Williams partnered with the 
DWA in hopes to organize the working poor in Atlanta.  The group targeted 
unrepresented and under-represented workers to secure health benefits, 
pensions, job security, and help negotiate grievances.  With an organizational 
structure that mirrored a typical labor union, DWA hoped to grow to 10,000 
members strong in Atlanta within a year and then move throughout the 
Southeast.224  Though they never reached the intended level of success, this 
ambitious goal fueled organizing attempts over the following year. 
 By the spring of 1973, Hosea Williams’ reputation as a strong supporter of 
Atlanta’s working class was firmly established.  On April 3, Rich’s Department 
Store, one of Atlanta’s top corporations, became the target of protest when two 
hundred fifty employees walked out to dispute racist employment practices.225  In 
the days immediately preceding this action two black employees had been fired – 
a foreman and the personnel manager, Ernie Brown.  Brown was dismissed for 
refusing to adhere to the informal quota system that limited the number of black 
hires.226  Workers noted inequitable hiring and promotion policies as the main 
reason for the strike.  Blacks held only four out of about three hundred 
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management positions throughout the Atlanta area, while the overall workforce at 
Rich’s was approximately thirty percent black.227  Because Atlanta’s workers had 
been organizing over the previous year, networks and support groups were 
already in place. 
 Rich’s management relied on its prominent standing in the Atlanta 
community, among both whites and blacks, to counter the strike’s affects.  On 
April 27, 1973, Rich’s took out a full page ad in the Atlanta Journal and 
Constitution. In response to the strike and boycott, management felt the need to 
communicate publicly with their supporters:   
A note of thanks to our loyal friends:  We want to thank all of our 
employees who have made it ‘business as usual’ at Rich’s and also thank 
out loyal customers who have continued to give us their patronage, 
despite current inconveniences.  If our service in any instance has not 
been up to its usual standards lately, it is not because of any lack of 
dedication or effort on the part of our working employees.” 228   
Another full page Rich’s advertisement in the Journal and Constitution two days 
later proclaimed that it was the company’s “Best Easter Ever” in hopes of 
drawing shoppers back into the store and showing that the company was 
unaffected by the strike.229  To the contrary, The Guardian reported that the 
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activists call for “a black Easter” resulted in a fifty percent decrease in sales.230  
On May 16, Rich’s appointed businessman Jesse Hill as the first black member 
of its board of directors.  Equally important, in a move that illustrated the black 
elite’s close relationship with the company, members of the Martin Luther King 
Center for Social Change named Rich’s board chairman Arthur J. Goldberg to 
their board.231   
 Picketers first convened on the flagship store downtown, but after an 
injunction limited assembly to three persons, they spread out to stores 
throughout the city.  A month into the strike, on May 5, workers organized a mule 
train march from the downtown store to the home of Harold Brockey, the 
Chairman of Rich’s Board of Directors.  Police stopped the procession and 
arrested fifty-one people, including Hosea Williams.  They booked Williams on a 
charge dating back to 1967, and jailed him with a set release date of June 11, 
1973.  Frustrated by Williams’ involvement, Rich’s president, Richard Rich, 
referred to him as “a charlatan, a drunkard, and an extortionist,” at a lecture at 
Emory University, which was reported in local newspapers.  Williams filed a 
slander lawsuit against Rich’s for $6 million, prompting Rich to issue a public 
apology.232  The following week, on May 12, Ralph David Abernathy led another 
march.  This time, they arranged for buses to drive them through the police 
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barricades so they could not be arrested and held a rally in front of Brockey’s 
home.233 
Unlike the unrest the previous year, some whites supported the strike.  
When the first group of strikers was arrested, an estimated one-third of those 
present at the candlelight vigil were white.234  Many white truck drivers, who 
recognized the unequal opportunities in their department, refused to cross the 
picket lines.  While some blacks held positions as delivery truck drivers with top 
pay at $3.75 per hour, there were no black semi-trailer drivers, a position with a 
starting pay of $5.00 per hour.  Even after Rich’s management sent letters 
threatening that they would be replaced by black drivers, many white drivers did 
not return to work.235  Though the white truck drivers held out as long as they 
could, pressure from the company eventually caused them to return for fear of 
permanently losing their jobs.236  When demonstrators rallied in front of Chairman 
Brockey’s home, sympathetic white neighbors offered their lawns so that they 
could avoid arrest and a rabbi offered his nearby synagogue as a place of 
refuge.237  While the majority of the black and white workers at Rich’s remained 
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polarized during the strike, the instances of solidarity and collaboration showed 
marked improvement over actions the previous year. 238 
After holding out for seven weeks, strikers agreed via secret ballot that 
they would return to work.  The result was a moderate success, as Rich’s agreed 
to only a few of their demands.  All strikers were rehired, though not necessarily 
in their previous positions and with no back pay.  One of the most significant 
victories addressed a major concern and cause of the strike: Rich’s management 
agreed to make improvements in their promotion practices.  New job openings 
had to be posted before filled, and the promotion had to be based on seniority, 
experience, training, and productivity.  Management agreed to meet regularly 
with employees to review these practices and also set up a special grievance 
committee.  More notable than any specific concession, the strikers believed they 
had won by exposing racist practices at Rich’s.239 
In addition to employment issues, continued police brutality complaints 
marred Atlanta’s “city too busy to hate” image.  By the spring of 1973, mounting 
police brutality in Atlanta prompted a group of concerned community members to 
form the Black Citizens Committee Against Police Repression.  The group aimed 
to “expose the nature of the police force in Atlanta as it relates to the black 
community…and expose the repressive conditions which black people are forced 
to live under which generates so-called criminal acts by Black people.”  The 
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previous summer, two black men were shot 29 times during a robbery.240 In 
February, white Atlanta police officers killed John Percy Boyd and Darnell 
Winfield, and they were suspected of killing Mark Bethune, who was found dead 
after a manhunt.241  In March, a 25-year old unarmed black man, Herbert Comer, 
was shot and killed by an Atlanta policeman.  In April, detective H.F. Pharr shot 
Charles Oliver in the head.242  On June 4, Officer J.D. Roberts shot a 14-old girl 
in Capital Homes housing projects when responding to her mother’s complaint 
about her erratic behavior.  Fortunately, the girl survived her wounds.243  By 
September, the Atlanta police had killed thirteen black people.    In response,  
local activist groups formed an organization called the Atlanta Anti-Repression 
Commission.  Sue Thrasher, a long time local civil rights activist and one of the 
earliest white members of SNCC, spoke at their September meeting, where she 
explained that a white officer named Bowen “has shot and killed five Black men 
in the past thirty months.  Four of the five were shot at least seven times.”244  In 
1973, more blacks were killed by Atlanta policemen than any other comparable 
city in the nation.  Atlanta’s black and progressive activist community focused 
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outrage on Police Chief John Inman.245  Traditional marches and protests could 
not bring about the change necessary to remedy police brutality in Atlanta.  This 
would require a change from the top down.  The coming mayoral election 
presented a timely opportunity for black Atlantans to exercise their increased 
power in local electoral politics. 
Atlanta’s power structure changed significantly during this time period.  A 
racially charged mayoral campaign captured the public’s attention in 1973.   
Incumbant mayor Sam Massell’s campaign slogan, “Atlanta’s Too Young to Die,” 
implied that a black mayor would prove fatal to the city’s progress.246  Massell’s 
platform focused on the potential economic consequences of white flight, and 
supported annexation of northern suburbs for the purpose of increasing the 
percentage of white citizens within city limits.  He told a black audience at Butler 
Street YMCA to “think white” when considering the economic future of the city, 
and warned whites that their property value would decline should blacks gain 
control – “It’s Cheaper to Vote Than to Move” one ad claimed.247  Additionally, 
Massell sought to mar Jackson’s image by associating him with Hosea Williams’ 
black radical persona.  An ad that ran in the October 10, 1973, Atlanta Journal 
read, “The thought of a Maynard Jackson – Hosea Williams administration is 
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scaring some Atlantans to death.”248  Massell unabashedly centered his 
language on the race of his opponent in an attempt to appeal to conservative 
whites. “One can almost see them dancing in the streets in anticipation of a black 
takeover,” he said.249 
Conversely, Maynard Jackson emphasized the need for biracial unity and 
inclusion in his campaign strategy, aspiring to “a situation whereby grass-roots 
leaders, white and black, will be sitting alongside of persons who are quite 
wealthy, quite influential, and sometimes not as attuned as they need to be to 
what it is really like to be living close to disaster.”250  Statements like this 
resonated with much of the electoral base.  Gary M. Pomerantz captured the 
electorate’s feeling best in his book, Where Peachtree Meets Sweet Auburn: A 
Saga of Race and Family.  “To many blacks in Atlanta in 1973, Maynard Jackson 
became more than just a mere candidate.  He was a cause, a symbol, a spiritual 
manifestation of black hopes and dreams a century old.”251   Maynard’s strategy 
proved most effective, as he won 95 percent of the black vote and 17.5 percent 
of the white vote, securing victory as the first black mayor of Atlanta or any other 
city in the South.252   
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Jackson’s victory signified the beginning of a new era in Atlanta.  In his 
inaugural address, Jackson declared, “We stand, not so much as a gateway to 
the South, but as a gateway to a new time, a new era, a new beginning for the 
cities of our land […] It is awesome to consider, but true:  we stand at a decisive 
point in history.  Everyone knows that the Old South is dead forever.”253  He went 
on to assert that it was up to Atlantans to forge a new South.  While in office, 
Mayor Jackson helped to open opportunities that blacks had been previously 
denied and changed the racial, gender and class composition of long-standing 
institutions.  As Ronald Bayor pointed out in his book Race and the Shaping 
…“The 1973 election was a stark reversal of the political past.  Electorally, the 
white business elite was reduced to junior partner in the biracial coalition.”254  
Both the new city council and the school board contained a balanced number of 
black and white members.  Dr. Benjamin E. Mays, president of Morehouse 
College, won the office of school board president.  Additionally, Jackson strongly 
supported Affirmative Action programs.  He publicly threatened that he would 
deposit city funds elsewhere if local banks did not appoint women and people of 
color to their boards and implement programs that would provide them access to 
executive level positions.  He also ensured black businesses access to 
construction contracts, particularly at the new airport, by threatening that he 
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would “let grass grow on runways” if they continued to be denied a share of 
business.255  
One of the biggest controversies Jackson encountered during his first term 
in office was his public conflict with Police Chief John Inman.  Jackson 
considered the black community’s uproar over incidents of police brutality and 
Inman’s refusal to adhere to affirmative action guidelines as grounds for 
dismissal, battling him in court twice to force him from office.256    Another 
significant change was the support that Jackson’s administration gave to the 
growing Neighborhood Movement, which was comprised mostly of young 
relatively progressive gentrification pioneers in Atlanta’s in-town neighborhoods.  
Largely in response to these activists’ efforts, a Neighborhood Planning Unit 
(NPU) system was implemented as a way to give individual neighborhoods more 
political clout, weakening the influence of the business elite’s former stronghold 
on the way the city was run.  “I will not cater exclusively to the old-line 
establishment leaders of Atlanta commerce, whose wishes were often granted by 
past administrations,”257 Jackson proclaimed.   
Though more radical currents in Atlanta’s activist community continued to 
push for more fundamental change, the majority of blacks and progressive whites 
found hope in the city’s political transformation.  However, while opportunities 
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expanded for middle class blacks, poor blacks continued to face problems with 
employment, housing, and city services. Those blacks who did gain power 
encountered conflicting agendas among their constituencies.  As Stone noted  
“Black business leaders were motivated to pursue cooperation with the white 
business elite.  Black community activists, practiced in confrontation politics, had 
no such incentives.”258  For example, while Hosea Williams thrived on 
confrontation, his adversary Andrew Young, who just won the 5th district seat in 
the United States House of Representatives, tended to take a more moderate 
stance.  Williams tolerated anyone who supported working-class rights while 
Young, in the words of The Call  “vowed to ‘run the communists out.’”259  Often, 
class overshadowed race in political compromise.  Throughout Maynard 
Jackson’s time in office, he wavered on issues concerning working class blacks.  
Much of his efforts turned out to benefit a middle class agenda.  By 1977, 
Jackson sided with Atlanta’s black middle class in opposition to a sanitation 
workers’ strike, despite the fact that he had fervently supported their strike during 
his term as vice mayor seven years earlier.260 
During this transition period, currents of radicalism continued to flow in 
Atlanta.  Due to the recognition gained through their efforts in organizing the 
city’s working class, the October League had become a key player in the New 
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Communist Movement.  As the Movement expanded, however, various factions 
began to compete along sectarian lines.  In a speech given at a Guardian- 
organized forum on party building in New York City on March 23, 1973, OL 
chairman Michael Klonsky stated, “We’ve got to expose opportunism!  We’ve got 
to expose the revisionists!  If we don’t fight revisionism, we’ll never be able to 
defeat imperialism.”261  One example of this ultra-leftism, which directly affected 
Atlanta’s progressive activist community, was OL’s takeover of the Southern 
Christian Education Fund (SCEF) in 1975-7.  SCEF and its predecessor 
organizations had been organizing in the South for many years, and was 
committed to a united front against racism regardless of ideological affiliation.  
Bob Zellner,262 one of the first white members of SNCC, had joined the October 
League and, along with other members, used his relationships within SCEF to 
incorporate New Communist ideologies into the group’s agenda. 263  Rather than 
continue their tradition of maintaining a united front in fighting racism in the 
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community, OL leadership within SCEF adopted the Chinese Communist Party’s 
“no united front with revisionism” policy.  They drove the members and 
sympathizers of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA), a group considered 
revisionist, out of the organization and forced resolutions touting anti-revisionist 
dogma in its literature. This resulted in an eighty percent decrease in the 
circulation of their newspaper, the Southern Patriot, and eventually contributed to 
major conflicts within the organization and ultimately its disbanding.264   
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Epilogue and Conclusion 
 
Though the labor unrest in 1972 is a largely forgotten chapter in Atlanta’s 
past, legacies of that year’s activities are still visible today.  Strike participants 
and supporters chose widely diverse paths, ranging from continued activism to 
climbing the corporate ladder.  Some have elected to keep their past participation 
in such activities a closely guarded secret, while others continue to work in their 
communities and carry on some version of the struggle that they began many 
years ago.  
Hosea Williams continued to agitate for black rights and work for the poor 
up until his death in 2000.   As he had done since returning from World War II in 
Savannah and during the Civil Rights Movement alongside Martin Luther King, 
Jr, Williams could be found on the front lines of marches for equal rights 
throughout the metro-Atlanta area for the next thirty years.  In 1987, he faced the 
Ku Klux Klan, leading a large group of demonstrators in Forsyth County, an area 
north of Atlanta, to protest segregated conditions.  Months prior to his death from 
prostate cancer, he managed to celebrate the thirty-fifth anniversary of his 
participation in “Bloody Sunday” by marching across the Edmund Pettus Bridge 
in Selma, Alabama.  His most lasting legacy is undoubtedly the Hosea Williams 
Feed the Hungry organization, now run by his daughter, which provides meals, 
showers, haircuts, clothing, and other services and resources for thousands of 
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Atlanta’s poor and homeless on Thanksgiving, Christmas, Easter, and 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s birthday each year.  Thousands of volunteers convene in 
large sports arenas on these holidays to carry out what Williams began.  Despite 
criticisms Williams may have faced during his lifetime for his brash style and 
confrontational tactics, his spirit lives on in that Atlantans from all walks of life 
equate his name with helping the poor. 
Williams’ right hand man in the Dekalb/Metro-Atlanta branch of the SCLC 
during this tumultuous period in the early 1970s was fellow civil rights veteran 
Tyrone Brooks. Building upon his experience organizing for the working poor in 
Atlanta, he went on to join the anti-apartheid struggle.  He was arrested in 1976 
for protesting the Soweto massacre in Washington, DC.  Brooks was first elected 
to the Georgia House of Representatives in 1980 and has served in this role ever 
since.  During the 1980s he called for all Georgia controlled funds to be pulled 
from South Africa’s white minority regime.   In 2001, the House Bill 16 he 
proposed to remove the confederate battle symbol (incorporated to protest 
school desegregation in 1956) from the Georgia flag finally passed after a 
twenty-year struggle.265      
Another notable political figure in Atlanta politics was also an active 
participant in the strikes in 1972.  As a Nabisco employee at the time, current 
Georgia State Representative Nan Orrock supported the efforts of black workers 
during the strike.  With a background as one of the earliest white participants in 
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the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Orrock empathized 
with her fellow workers as they faced discriminatory employment conditions.  
Following the strike, management attempted to fire her for her participation, 
labeling her as a “trouble maker;” but as she contends, “if you’re of the opinion 
that black people are inferior and can’t lead themselves, you’re obviously going 
to believe the white person that’s there is the one leading.”  She fondly 
remembers the way the Nabisco workers and the local black community banded 
together to fight for equal treatment, and notes that some of the specific 
concessions realized from their efforts, such as an open-door policy with 
management, representative grievance committees, and the Martin Luther King 
birthday holiday are practiced to this day.  She sometimes joins workers at an 
annual reunion where they reminisce about and celebrate their 1972 victory, 
which holds somewhat of a legendary status.  Orrock moved from union and 
neighborhood organizing into state politics in 1987.  She has maintained a 
progressive agenda throughout her political career, championing neighborhood 
issues, serving as a peoples’ advocate across class lines, and holding leadership 
roles in organizations such as the National Organization for Women (NOW).     
Because of her affiliation with labor activists at Nabisco during that time 
period, despite her respected role in the community for over forty years of 
service, her political opponents stooped to a red-baiting attack during her 2002 
Georgia state legislative campaign, a price she paid for simply supporting her 
colleagues in their struggle for equal treatment.  Despite this, Orrock won that 
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election and is currently running for state senate.  Her 2006 campaign web site, 
www.nanforsenate.info, proudly boasts her past as a SNCC organizer and 
member of the Bakery, Confectionary, and Tobacco union at Nabisco, as well as 
the fact that she helped to found an alternative newspaper (Atlanta’s nationally 
acclaimed progressive underground newspaper, The The Great Speckled Bird, 
published from 1968 -1976). 266    
Gary Washington, who served as the treasurer of the Mead Caucus of 
Rank and File Workers during the strike in 1972, has remained active in Atlanta’s 
progressive community since his participation in the strike.  Washington had 
worked in New York City’s garment industry in his late teens and took for granted 
its labor tradition.  When he arrived in Atlanta to attend college at Morehouse and 
took a job at Mead, he was surprised at the weak status of the union.  Though he 
never joined the October League, he identified with what they aimed to do at 
Mead and immediately became active in the organizing efforts.  Because of his 
dedication, Washington’s colleagues encouraged him to become shop steward 
following the strike.  He continued to work at Mead for over thirty years, and 
noted that conditions never reverted to the level they had been prior to the strike.  
Going forward, management understood that workers would no longer tolerate 
blatantly discriminatory practices.  In his leadership role, Washington never 
stopped challenging management when workers were treated unfairly.  He was 
dismissed several times over the years for his actions, only to regain his position 
                                                
266 Georgia State Representative Nan Orrock.  “Meet Nan.” Nanforsenate.info.  
(accessed 19 May 2006). 
117 
under union protection.  As a union representative, he currently spends long 
hours in meetings with co-workers to discuss grievances and resolve conflicts, a 
mechanism which mirrors one of the strike’s concessions.  In addition to his 
union service, Washington is a widely recognized voice for labor throughout 
Atlanta.  As host of “Labor Forum,” progressive radio WRFG’s weekly show, he 
keeps Atlantans abreast of current labor and community issues and welcomes 
various guests for informative discussions.  He is also a familiar face at 
community meetings and rallies in support of a diverse array of progressive 
agendas. 
John Fletcher was active in OL’s efforts in Atlanta in 1972.   Originally 
from a household where both parents were educators in a racially diverse inner-
city neighborhood in Washington D.C., Fletcher attended Duke University.  While 
at Duke, he took classes on Marxism and labor history, his interest having been 
peeked by hearing stories about his grandfather’s work as a railroad unionist.  As 
a student, Fletcher became involved in the Civil Rights Movement and liberal 
Democratic political campaigns.  During the late 1960s, he became increasingly 
disillusioned with “the system” and began to identify with the New Left. A 
contributing factor in this sentiment was his former roommate’s death in the 
Vietnam War – he failed out of classes, was immediately drafted, and was killed 
within months.  During the tumultuous days of 1968, Fletcher’s activism took 
precedence over education, and he dropped out of Duke just prior to graduation 
to take a factory job in Greensboro, North Carolina, to help organize the workers.  
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The network of organizations in which he was involved assigned him to Atlanta to 
enter the factories and organize the workers there.  Shortly thereafter, he was 
present at the meeting where the October League and Georgia Communist 
League unified.   
Over the next few months, Fletcher worked diligently attempting to 
organize workers at a local railroad company, handing out newspapers and flyers 
at factory gates around the city and participating in weekly Marxist study groups.  
He was assigned to work at Mead after the strike to pick up on the momentum to 
organize the white workers, though he admits only moderate success.  His next 
assignment, along with several other organizers from Atlanta, was to move to 
Birmingham, Alabama to organize steel workers.  He worked in the factories in 
Birmingham for several more years, was blacklisted from the steel industry,  and 
later fired from two other plants for his organizing activity.  Today he admits only 
limited success in mobilizing the workers.   
By the late 1970s, the October League and New Communist Movement 
had begun to unravel.  During this time, he and his wife became active in the US-
China Peoples’ Friendship Organization, and his wife traveled to China in 1978 
as a representative of the CP (ML).  Fletcher returned to school, received his 
degree from Duke in 1981, and has been teaching high school social studies 
outside of Birmingham for more than twenty years.  Today, he serves his 
community through his role as a respected teacher, remains informed on 
progressive issues and scholarship, and maintains the same general belief 
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system that prompted him into political action in his youth.  While he has some 
regrets for postponing his career, he is proud to have been on what he considers 
“the right side of history.”   
Wayne Draznin, one of the few white members of the Mead Caucus of 
Rank and File Workers and who is featured throughout the film Wildcat at Mead, 
died of cancer in 2001.  As an artist, professor, and filmmaker, Draznin remained 
involved in progressive political activism throughout his remaining years.  His 
most enduring work was as a film maker.  He produced several controversial 
documentaries. His film “Shell Game” investigates Shell Oil’s responsibility for 
environmental destruction in Nigeria, and his final film “Mark as Another” 
chronicles his cancer-ravaged body shortly before his death.  (The camera 
“slowly pans up his body, sparing neither scars nor genitals.  A final scene shows 
an eye moving closer and closer to the camera lens, until the watcher feels 
watched.  It is creepy – and chillingly effective – art that creates an 
uncomfortable intimacy.”267) Right up until his death, Draznin did not shy from 
making others uncomfortable with the truth of a subject.  At his memorial service, 
a colleague read a passage written by Ken Saro-Wiwa, the Nigerian writer, 
activist, and martyr to whom Draznin had dedicated “Shell Games”:  “Whether I 
live or die is immaterial. It is enough to know that there are people who commit 
time, money and energy to fight this one evil among so many others 
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predominating worldwide.  If they do not succeed today, they will succeed 
tomorrow.”  Friends agreed that this passage captured Draznin’s unwavering 
commitment to noble causes.268 
 Michael Klonsky is a red-diaper baby who first became active in Students 
for a Democratic Society.  In 1969, he joined the Revolutionary Youth Movement, 
which evolved into the October League under his leadership and eventually 
became the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist).  He resigned as the CP(ML) 
chairman in 1981. Klonsky went on to teach in the Chicago area, obtained a PhD 
in education, and now works as an advocate for public school reform.   He 
proposes  small schools to remedy the ills of the existing education system, and 
has written several books and teaches workshops on the subject.  
Sherman Miller continued organizing with the OL/CP (M-L) for the next 
several years, serving as a spokesman and key organizer.  By 1978, the 
psychological stress endured through prolonged organizing efforts led to drug 
and alcohol abuse and what Miller described as a “breakdown.”  In a “Self-
Criticism” written in January 1979, he attributed this breakdown to individualism 
as opposed to party alignment, living in contradiction to his work (i.e. spending 
90% of his time with whites, including his wife, while “leading the party’s Afro-
American work”), guilt, and isolationism.269  Because of his behavior, the CP(ML) 
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placed him on probation for several months and ultimately expelled him from the 
organization on March 22, 1979.270   
Neither the October League nor any other New Communist organization 
ever gained massive or nationwide support.  When asked why the October 
League had such difficulty attracting black supporters, John Fletcher recalled a 
telling encounter.  He was having a discussion with one of his black coworkers 
about the corrupt capitalist political system, espousing his Marxist views, and the 
coworker nodded and agreed throughout his tirade.   Fletcher ended by saying 
that he was not going to vote in the upcoming election, and urged his friend to 
abstain as well.  When his friend responded by saying he was going to vote 
anyway, he started to counter with all of the reasons he should not, when it 
suddenly dawned on him what he was doing: 
Here I’m trying to talk this black guy out of voting in 1972 when he just got 
the right to vote [a few] years earlier, and had been fighting for it for two 
generations, and I’m talking him out of voting, which was idiotic.  I think 
maybe things like that were why we didn’t make the progress we thought 
we were going to.  
 
In his opinion, they were out of touch with reality, too caught up in ultra-left 
dogmatism to attract widespread support or produce significant change. 
Additionally, he explained that had they had read Lenin closely enough, they 
would have realized that the conditions were not rife for revolution.  Employers 
had not reached a point where they had run out of options rather than negotiate, 
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while employees had not reached a level of dissatisfaction that would have 
fueled the desire to overthrow the whole system.271   
Throughout the mid-1970s New Communist organizations continued to vie 
for dominance over the Movement.  Having ascended to the position as the most 
widely respected vanguardist group in the Maoist vein, the October League 
announced their transformation into the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) in 
1977 and elected Michael Klonsky to serve as its Chaiman and Eileen Klehr as 
Vice Chairman.  Both Klonsky and Klehr had been affiliated with OL’s activities in 
Atlanta.272 Klonsky, Klehr and a US Maoist delegation traveled to China and 
received recognition from Chinese Communist Party Chairman Hua Guofeng.  
After returning, the CP (ML) took advantage of its mounting reputation to 
increase its membership by twelve percent.   
Carl Davidson summed up the fall of the New Communist Movement by 
outlining the final period of the Communist Party (M-L) in a January 1985 issue of 
Forward: Journal of Socialist Thought.  His analysis pointed out some of the 
successes, but focuses on the ultimate pitfalls. He felt that the organization, and 
thus the movement, was destroyed by infighting and revisionism.  Without strong 
organizations, many sympathizers faltered in their support.  According to the 
article:   
Thousands who were members of Marxist-Leninist organizations in the 
1970s and early 1980s no longer consider themselves part of the 
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communist movement.  And growing numbers of these are no longer 
active even in the mass movements – they have simply ‘burned out’ and 
retreated into private life.273 
 
He called upon remaining communist sympathizers to engage former activists in 
current struggles by taking advantage of the skills and experienced they gained.  
Davidson ended by noting that, “The history of revolution shows that successful 
parties are mainly comprised of young people, the new and dynamic element in 
their class and society…They are our first priority for the future.”274   
Today’s young leftists, however, have not learned the lessons of the New 
Communist Movement.  Indeed, most of them are not even aware that the 
movement occurred.  In popular memory, “the sixties” ended in 1968.  New Left 
activists blew the way of the Weathermen, became absorbed by mainstream 
liberalism, or were seduced to the other end of the political spectrum with the rise 
of neo-conservatism.  Many young progressives would be shocked to learn that 
some of their professors, teachers, or neighbors, whom they might suspect of 
having been hippies in their youth, actually had worked in factories organizing for 
the same issues of social and economic justice that are important today.   John 
Fletcher expressed a sentiment likely shared by many former activists.  With a 
touch of humor, but sincerity, he said: 
I look at guys like Harry Haywood… who were still around in the sixties 
and seventies… I’m thinking maybe ten years from now as our economy 
collapses under this weight of debt, and the world economy goes into a 
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tailspin and the situation really does get bad, then maybe I’ll play that role. 
I’ll crawl back out of the woodwork [and say] ‘Hey guys, I was around in 
the sixties… I can help.’   
 
Those from the New Left, no matter the path they subsequently chose in life, 
carry with them the wisdom of experience.  Today’s activists could potentially 
benefit from dialogue with these movement veterans.    
Popular memory often equates Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination with 
the death of the Civil Rights Movement.  King’s final work – the sanitation 
workers’ strike in Memphis – could have been seen as a directive or a suggestion 
for the next steps for activists to take.  Either by realizing this or through natural 
progression, some organizers believed the most pressing issues black 
Americans faced centered on poverty and class.  Accounts of minority workers 
organizing, agitating, and rising up against corporations in order to enjoy of the 
legal rights earned in the previous decade are largely lost.  Films like Finally Got 
the News document the perspective militant blacks had on labor in this period, 
yet this element is typically missing from black history lessons.  Michael K. 
Honey’s Black Workers Remember:  An Oral History of Segregation, Unionism, 
and the Freedom Struggle contributed significantly to our understanding of the 
role black workers played in advancing both the black community and the 
working class.  As one of the book’s reviewers realizes, “Black workers were not 
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just part of the Civil Rights Movement in Memphis – they were the movement.”275  
Direct extensions of the Civil Rights Movement agenda, these stories expand the 
commonly held narrative and add to the understanding of the long Civil Rights 
Movement, the wide scope of time from the 1940s to the 1970s during which 
blacks struggled for equal treatment. 
“Strike Fever” in Atlanta in 1972 was symptomatic of a larger 
phenomenon.  The confidence and experience gained through the Civil Rights 
Movement and the New Left in the 1960s merged to create a dynamic force.  
This energy produced a spreading wave of optimism that carried the activists well 
into  the 1970s.  Atlanta’s political atmosphere during this period served as both 
a catalyst and incubator for movement struggles.   
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